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Introduction 
 
Throughout European history, many states have come and gone. The map of Europe has 
been redrawn so many times that it is nearly impossible to remember all the territorial and 
political changes that even the tiniest of European states have undergone over the centuries. 
The territory that is governed by European states today entails many regions that once were 
proud, independent nations themselves. Some of the present-day European states have had 
a long national history within their current borders (like France or the Netherlands) whilst 
others have found themselves in their current territory quite recently (like Poland or the 
successor states of Yugoslavia). This long history of appearing and disappearing states and 
nations within Europe has left a vastly differing landscape of regional identities, cultures and 
languages all over the continent. The national states have often granted certain degrees of 
autonomy to these regional communities. Many of these regions are quite content with this 
framework within their current states. Simultaneously, many others are far from satisfied 
with the situation.           
 An estimate of twenty to twenty-five ‘significant separatist movements’ are currently 
active within the geographically defined area of Europe.2 Many of them have existed for 
decades and whilst some of them have violent pasts (like the ETA or the IRA) many others 
have solely operated through peaceful ways and have received only little attention of the 
European public. Separatist parties like the Scottish National Party (SNP) or the Vlaams Blok 
have in general been rather insignificant in election results across Europe, up until recently. 
For some reason, many of these separatist parties have made an impressive rise to power in 
recent elections. Indeed, the SNP nowadays embodies a majority government in the Scottish 
regional government, whilst the SNP’s Catalonian and Flemish counterparts are in fact the 
biggest political parties within their respective political systems. As a result, separatism has 
become a serious political movement within Europe: there are real possibilities that certain 
regions might pursue statehood in the immediate years that lay ahead of us. This year, 2014, 
will see the organization of independence referenda in Scotland and Catalonia. Regional 
secession is a real, short-term possibility in Europe.      
 Many questions arise following the mere possibility of regional secession from 
current EU member-states. First of all, how can the separatist movements be defined and 
upon what legitimation do they base their claims to independence? Is there a European 
pattern underneath these movements? Moreover, what is the position of the member states 
in which these movements operate towards separatism? Equally important, what is the 
position of the EU towards these movements? There are many angles to approach these 
questions. Identity for one certainly plays a part in the claims to independence and the 
strength of these claims. Political views are equally important, as are economic interests and 
legal issues. Especially politics and law often have contradictory interpretations on this topic, 
                                                          
2
 Christopher J. Borgen, From Kosovo to Catalonia: Separatism in Europe, (2010) in: Journal of International Law 
2, Vol. 3 p.1009 
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making it interesting to see what arguments are likely to prevail.    
 Even though some politicians would like to define separatism as ‘domestic issues’, 
the EU has a very large role to play when it comes to the political discourse and success of 
separatist movements. ‘Brussels’ is often portrayed as the preferable alternative, as a safety 
net that will ensure that all vital (economic) relations with the former nation will be 
maintained after secession. Not surprisingly, many separatist movements are therefore very 
pro-EU in their political programs and often claim that EU-membership will be retained after 
secession. However, the EU itself isn’t as supportive of these movements as the other way 
around. In principle, the EU institutions only talk to national governments (with the sole 
exception of the Committee of the Regions) and try to avoid any involvement in the 
‘domestic issues’ that member states have with their regions. In practice however, the 
regions are often well-represented in Brussels through lobbying offices or MEPs that support 
their causes.3            
 At any rate, well before there has been any independence referendum, the debate 
about what would happen to seceding regions in terms of their EU-membership has been 
launched. Whereas the SNP for example claims that Scotland would automatically remain 
part of the EU if it were to secede from the UK,4 the Commission president Barroso has said 
that seceding regions would have to apply for membership like any new candidate-state. 
This in turn would be ‘extremely difficult, if not impossible’, since all existing member states 
would have to agree with the ‘enlargement’ of the Union with a new member state.5 This 
‘internal enlargement’, if it were to take place, obviously would open up various new 
debates. Questions regarding the re-adjusted number of MEPs per country and the size of 
the Commission are examples of what could be expected. Thus, the EU has serious stakes in 
the unity of its member states, and can therefore at least be expected to try and influence 
the separatist phenomenon within member states according to its own interests. 
Without any doubt the EU-context is very important when studying separatism in Europe. 
The focus of this thesis will therefore be upon three cases of separatist regions that have 
serious prospects of pursuing statehood in the near future. Scottish, Catalonian and Flemish 
separatists all have very much designed a major role for the EU within their independence 
schemes. The primary aim of this thesis will therefore be twofold. First of all, this thesis will 
focus on whether a European pattern exists among separatist movements. This will be done 
by zooming in on the phenomenon of separatism within the EU, and thoroughly analysing 
three separate cases. Secondly, this thesis will try to answer the question why these 
separatist movements are all as pro-EU as they are. The seemingly contradictory nature of 
separatist movements and European integration (i.e. the aim for decentralization of 
                                                          
3
 Justin Greenwood, Interest Representation in the European Union, 3
rd
 edition, (New York, 2011) p.176-198 
4
 ‘Scotland and the rest of the UK would be equally entitled to continue their existing full membership of the EU.’ 
See: Sunday Herald newspaper, 18 February 2007, quoted in Keith Medhurst, (MA thesis) Secession and 
Accession: A Multi-dimensional perspective on Scotland’s independent membership of the European Union 
following a possible split with the United Kingdom, (2014) p.21 
5
 BBC News, Scottish Independence: Barroso says joining EU would be ‘difficult’, published at 16-2-2014, 
accessed at 02-05-2014 via: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-26215963 
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sovereignty whilst supporting a supra-national body) makes this an interesting question. This 
should finally lead towards a comprehensive study in which the structures, driving forces 
and scenarios of European separatism are untangled.  
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Note on sources and methods: 
The cases of separatism that are studied in this thesis are all subject to very recent events 
developments. Many key events and political decisions have only been taken during the past couple 
of years, which means that the full scope of consequences of these decisions often aren’t fully clear 
yet. Because of the novelty of the subject, a lacuna in academic research still exists for many aspects 
of the Scottish, Catalonian and Flemish cases. For this reason, this thesis can not and will not be 
solely based on scientific studies but occasionally will refer to the work of journalists and news 
agencies that are deemed credible by this author. Furthermore, some expert interviews and (written) 
opinions shall be considered. Despite these methodological limitations, this author is confident that 
the combination of a solid theoretical framework and a variety of sources on recent developments 
will be more than sufficient to answer the posed research questions to satisfaction. 
 
 
Note on Scottish case: 
Shortly after the first draft of this thesis was finished, the Scottish voted against independence in 
their referendum. Readers of this thesis are requested to bear in mind the pre-referendum context in 
which this thesis was written. Moreover, the SNP has made it clear that it retains independence as its 
ultimate goal. Thus, much of the analysis remains relevant, even after the ‘no’-vote in the 
referendum. 
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Chapter I: Separatism as a phenomenon 
 
Definitions 
 
Separatism as a phenomenon might seem as a fairly straightforward process to many. Yet, a 
great deal of variety exists among the goals and means of the movements that are labelled 
or that label themselves as ‘separatist’. The official Oxford dictionary defines separatism as 
‘The advocacy or practice of separation of a certain group of people from a larger body on 
the basis of ethnicity, religion, or gender’.6 If one would stick to this definition any group of 
people could be defined as separatists, ranging from feminists to religious minorities. To this 
end it may be useful to phrase a more precise definition of what is meant when this article 
refers to ‘separatism’. The Oxford dictionary’s definition of ‘secession’ already comes close: 
‘The action of withdrawing formally from membership of a federation or body, especially a 
political state’.7 Yet, this definition only refers to the actual deed of seceding and not so 
much to the movement that preludes secession. Therefore the definition for ‘separatism’ 
used in this thesis shall be:  
“The (political) movement that pursues independent, national statehood for its own 
territorial entity, and which seeks to accomplish that goal through secession from the 
existing central, national state” 
In essence this can be explained as a movement that pursues the secession of a region from 
the greater national order. The simplified explanation of separatism would therefore be 
‘actively pursuing regional secession’. Secession, if successful, could in turn be explained as 
the ‘appearance of a non-existing independent state from an existing independent state’. 
The separatist movements considered in this study will therefore only consist of movements 
that actually pursue full independence for their region. Regional movements that have no 
clear intentions beyond acquiring some degree of regional autonomy within their current 
national framework will therefore play no great role within this study.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Oxford Dictionaries, Separatism, accessed at 28-05-2014 via: 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/separatism 
7
 Oxford Dictionaries, Secession, accessed at 28-05-2014 via: 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/secession 
12 
 
Origins 
 
Separatist movements often provide a rich variety of arguments to justify their causes. 
Skilled politicians can come up with many reasons why a region should be independent 
rather than be part of their current national state, and in practice they certainly do support 
their claims with a broad, rich array of arguments. History, economics, ethnicity, and culture 
are often skilfully melted into a common, regional identity and a justified claim to 
independence, which in turn is exploited by separatist politicians. In order to understand the 
origins of separatism it is therefore necessary to create an academic overview of these 
arguments.           
 Key to understanding the forces behind European separatist movements is Benedict 
Anderson’s famous theory on imagined communities. Anderson’s theory describes the 
existence of imagined communities besides actual, face-to-face communities. According to 
this theory, which puts a lot of emphasis on national communities, a group of people can in 
their minds share an idea of communion without personally knowing the greater part of that 
community’s ‘members’. Moreover, the theory embraces the idea that these communities 
are finite and have clear boundaries beyond which lay other nations. In short the theories 
entails that even though there’s no-one in for example France that knows all Frenchmen, 
there still exists some idea of a ‘French’ community among most of the Frenchmen and that 
this community is different from the German community. Even without knowing each other, 
members of this imagined community share common identical features, such as language, 
social norms, habits and (imagined) traditions. Often these common community features 
have been created artificially over time (such as standardized languages or national 
anthems), but are perceived to be logical and self-evident by the members of a community. 
Membership of such a community is often expressed by references to a shared history, 
(national) symbols, myths and culture. 8 One could for example think of the Dutch 
community dressing in Orange during King’s Day or a World Cup performance as expressions 
of membership of the ‘Dutch imagined community’.      
 In all cases of separatism within the EU, an imagined regional community exists. If we 
zoom in on the cases of Scotland, Catalonia and Flanders it immediately becomes clear that 
significant signs of imagined communities are present. All regions have their own flag, 
language (albeit as a dialect) and cultural (imagined) traditions that are noticeably different 
from those of the national imagined community: 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism, (London, 
1983) 
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Catalunya (Català)   Alba (Ghaìdhlig na h-Alba)             Vlaanderen(Vlaams) 
 
Anna Brigevich’s work on territorial identity offers several additional important insights to 
these imagined communities, which she defines as territorial identities. According to 
Brigevich, identity serves two human needs: inclusion (‘the desire for belonging’) and 
differentiation (‘the need for… individuation and personal identity’).9 Often multiple 
territorial identities and sub-identities co-exist to satisfy these needs. An example within the 
EU-context: “A strong national identity satisfies the individual’s needs for differentiation (I 
am Spanish and thus different from the French or Italians), while a strong European identity 
satisfies the need for inclusion (we are all Europeans).”10 Therefore different identities can 
serve different ‘needs’, resulting in the fact that some territorial identities (no matter if they 
are local, regional, national or even supra-national) can be exclusive and thus negative 
effects towards other ‘layers’ of identity. An individual that identifies itself for example with 
an exclusive regional identity is less likely to feel equally attached to the national identity 
(e.g. Scottish identity versus British identity). Furthermore, these territorial identities can be 
distinctive or non-distinctive, where distinctive features such as ethnicity, language, political 
arrangements with other nations and the economic situation may make certain groups 
clearly distinctive from the nation as a whole. Brigevich defines these distinctive identities as 
national minorities.11 Even though Brigevich’s territorial identities show a lot of similarities 
with Anderson’s imagined communities, the former adds some useful insights in the 
different needs and ‘layers’ between these groups.  
History is another major component of these imagined communities. Especially when a 
region has experienced statehood in the (distant) past, imagined communities with 
separatist elements tend to refer to this past as a justification of why their region should 
become independent again.12 Although the role of history for our three cases will be 
discussed in more depth further on in this thesis, one can think of the pride that many 
                                                          
9
 Anna Brigevich, Peeling Back the Layers: Territorial Identity and EU Support in Spain, (2012) in: Regional & 
Federal Studies, 22:2, 205-207 
10
 Idem, p.207 
11
 Idem, p.211-213 
12
 I.e. the principle of (historical) continuity, see: Konrad Bühler, State succession and membership of 
international organizations, legal theory versus political pragmatism, (The Hague, 2001) p.18 
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Catalans take in the history of the Medieval Empire of Aragon-Catalonia and the references 
that Scottish nationalists often make to the dreaded 1707 Act of Union as examples.13 Even 
though centuries may have lapsed and the historical state wasn’t anything like the modern 
imagined community, history tends to be adapted to fit the needs of separatists. 
Self-determination 
Nevertheless, there are far more imagined regional communities within Europe than 
regional separatist movements. The discrepancy can be explained through the principle of 
self-determination, a legal principle that originates from Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points 
and which was subsequently adopted into the U.N. Charter.14 According to Borgen, this 
principle can be explained as: ‘At its most basic level, the right to self-determination is 
generally understood to be “the right of the cohesive national groups (‘peoples’) to choose 
for themselves a form of political organization and their relations to other groups”.’15 This 
doesn’t mean that ‘any cohesive national group’ has the liberty to claim a newly 
independent state, but that ‘the choice of political system and pursuit of economic, social 
and cultural development would occur under the auspices of an existing State, and would not 
require the establishment of a new State.’16 In the post-decolonization era, this should be 
defined as internal self-determination, and is closely related to the protection of (national) 
minority rights within states. According to some academic commentators, internal self-
determination is said to be achieved ‘as long as a State allows a minority group the right to 
speak its language, practice its culture in a meaningful way, and participate effectively in the 
political community’.17          
 Thus, most of the imagined regional communities within Europe possess such 
internal self-determination that they have neither serious desire for secession nor legitimate 
claims for political independence. An example of this is the Dutch region of Friesland 
(Fryslân), where the regional imagined community’s language (Frysk) enjoys legal protection 
and can be used by the Frisians in education and when communicating with public 
institutions within their province.18 Since the practicing of Frisian culture isn’t obstructed and 
Frisian nationalist parties can freely participate in the elections,19 it can be established that 
Fryslân enjoys internal self-determination.        
 The other side of the coin is external self-determination. The crude difference is that 
with external self-determination, the minority or regional imagined community actually 
                                                          
13
 Norman Davies, Vanished Kingdoms: The History of Half-forgotten Europe, (2012)  
14
 See Art.1.2 and Art.55 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
15
 Cristopher Borgen, From Kosovo to Catalonia, p.1004 
16
 Ibidem 
17
 Idem, p. 1005 
18
 Dutch law: Art.3 and art. 9, Wet van 2 oktober 2013, houdende regels met betrekking tot het gebruik van de 
Friese taal in het bestuurlijk verkeer en in het rechtsverkeer, accessed at 24-06-2014 via: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0034047/geldigheidsdatum_24-06-2014 
19
 Examples are the Fryske Nasjonale Partij and the Provinciaal Belang Fryslân, which are both elected to the 
provincial estates of Friesland. See: Politieke Partijen Friesland, accessed at 24-06-2014 via: 
http://www.fispr.nl/politieke-partijen-provincie-friesland/ 
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secedes from the existing national framework and appears as a new sovereign state. 
Acquiring external self-determination or even establishing that external self-determination 
has been acquired is very difficult. The easiest road to such sovereignty would be by mutual 
accord with the state from which a state secedes. An example is Czechoslovakia, that 
disbanded into the Czech and Slovakian republics peacefully.20 Nevertheless, even when a 
‘divorce’ is mutually-agreed, the terms of the secession might still be subject of much 
debate, especially when things such as public debt and natural resources are to be divided 
among the successor states.      
Unilateral Secession 
However, in most cases external self-determination is acquired through a unilateral act of 
secession. This is where things become very complicated, since multiple established 
principles in international law can be interpreted contradictory. Most importantly, sovereign 
states can rely upon the principle of territorial integrity, meaning as much as that only the 
central state can decide upon matters concerning its territory. In other words, without 
consent of the central government, unilateral secession wouldn’t be legal in the eyes of 
international law: ‘a right of self-determination was not a general right of secession.’21 
Moreover, according to Bühler, in order to apply to international law an entity must have a 
certain ‘international status’, i.e. ‘The status of a subject of international law is its legal 
position determined by the scope of its international capacity to assume rights and 
obligations, its capacity to act and to incur responsibility.”22 As a consequence regions would 
formally not be able to apply to international law, since they lack the capacity to assume 
international rights and obligations, and secession issues would therefore be considered as 
domestic issues. Borgen summarizes this by stating that ‘international law is largely silent 
regarding secession, and attempted secessions are, first and foremost, assessed under 
domestic law.’23          
 The legal difficulties of establishing external self-determination through unilateral 
secession are important to consider for this thesis. Especially in the Catalonian case, it seems 
unlikely that Madrid will ever cooperate with any secession attempt whatsoever, so without 
diving into that case all too deeply yet, it is important to know what the prospects for 
actually acquiring international recognized sovereignty through a unilateral act are. 
Mutually-agreed secession relates to different debates and will therefore be discussed later 
on.            
 In practice, political choices from international actors are far more decisive for the 
chances of unilateral secessionists than international law.24 Despite some objective and 
subjective criteria for statehood, a state can only operate as a state when it is recognized by 
                                                          
20
Bruno Coppieters, Secessionist Conflicts in Europe, p.237, in: Don H. Doyle (ed.), Secession as an international 
phenomenon: From America’s Civil War to Contemporary Separatist Movements, (Athens, Georgia, 2010) 
21
 Cristopher Borgen, From Kosovo to Catalonia, p.1005 
22
 Konrad Bühler, State succession and membership of international organizations, chapter I 
23
 Cristopher Borgen, From Kosovo to Catalonia, p.1005 
24
 Konrad Bühler, State succession and membership of international organizations, p.17 
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third countries.25 According to a professor of Leiden University’s Law Faculty, Niels Blokker, 
political considerations always play a key role when international actors decide to recognize 
an emerging state or not after a unilateral secession, with only a supportive or guiding role 
at best for international law.26 Thus, due to their ambiguity that exists in international law on 
this subject, political support from third countries is crucial for the success of separatists. 
 Because of this crucial need for external political support, separatist movements have 
to put a lot of effort in justifying their cause, not just to their own community, but also to the 
outside world. According to Coppieters, there are two accepted brands of justification. First 
of all: the just cause. When minorities or (imagined) communities face flagrant injustices, 
discrimination or mass human rights violations by the central government, they are 
presumed to have a just cause for unilateral secession. In addition, certain historical 
experiences can serve as just causes, such as genocide or war crimes. Yet, even when 
separatists do have a just cause unilateral secession is seen as a last resort, a final solution to 
an otherwise unsolvable situation. Secondly, free choice can serve as a justification for 
secession. This usually entails a referendum, where the democratic choice of a group of 
people justifies the intentions of a separatist movement.27 Although the idea might seem 
simple, decisions regarding who can actually vote and how the referendum questions should 
be phrased can be the subject of intense political conflict. Moreover, when a referendum is 
organized without the consent of the central government or when only the inhabitants of a 
certain part of the country (the seceding region for example) are allowed to vote, the 
legitimacy of the free choice justification may diminish. Scottish and Catalonian separatist 
parties both claim that secession would be their free choice. However, whereas the Scottish 
independence referendum is in accordance with London (mutually-agreed), Madrid does not 
agree to the Catalonian (unilateral) intentions of a similar referendum, claiming that all 
Spaniards should be allowed to vote on matters concerning Spain.28   
 Thus, justification plays a key role in the process of acquiring international political 
support for (intended) unilateral secession. Without legitimacy, an act of unilateral secession 
will not be recognized by third countries. In many recent cases unilateral secession has led to 
the violent suppression of separatist movements by the central government,29 underlining 
the importance of international recognition. Without recognition, the separatist conflict 
would be defined as a domestic issue, limiting the possibilities for international forces to 
intervene in violent conflict. With international recognition, the seceded state could call for 
international aid due to violations of the principle of territorial integrity.   
                                                          
25
 Idem, examples of the objective criteria are: territory, armed forces, diplomatic services resources and a seat 
of government. Examples of subjective criteria are: a claim to (historical/ cultural/ ethnical) continuity, self-
conception and above all recognition by third states. 
26
 One of many conclusions following an interview by this author with prof. dr. N.M. Blokker of Leiden 
University at 16-06-2014.  
27
 Bruno Coppieters, Secessionist Conflicts in Europe, p.249-251 
28
 The Guardian, Spain set to reject Catalonia’s request for independence referendum, (08-04-2014) accessed at 
04-07-2014 via: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/08/spain-set-to-reject-catalonia-indpendence-
referendum 
29
 Bruno Coppieters, Secessionist Conflicts in Europe, p.240-244 
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 In addition, the pioneer works on separatism of Allen Buchanan emphasize that there 
is a difference between a moral right to secede and the international institutional moral 
right to secede. With these definitions he underlines that even when a group possesses a 
morally justified claim, it might not possess the normative or institutional right to secede.30 
This underlines that a just cause or a free choice on itself is not enough, but that 
international support for a claim (i.e. recognition) is needed. Even when a seceded state 
exists de facto, it can only properly function as a juridical sovereign state if the fact of its 
existence is recognized by third countries.31 Without international recognition a state is 
unable to possess the basic qualifications of a sovereign state, since it will not be able to 
control a defined territory and won’t be able to enter into relations with other states either.32 
Besides foreign support in separatist conflict, international political support is therefore 
crucial if a separatist movement ever wishes to acquire basic statehood.   
 When international recognition is not unanimous, as in the case of Kosovo in 2008, 
an awkward situation might occur. Many countries had already made the political decision 
to recognize the unilateral secession of Kosovo whilst some others claimed that it was 
against international law. For these countries political considerations obviously played an 
important role in the decision to deny Kosovo’s secession. Remarkably, some EU-countries 
that were experiencing separatist tendencies themselves refused to recognize Kosovo’s 
secession in fear of creating a legal precedent for their own separatist movements. Even 
today, countries such as Spain, Romania, Cyprus and Greece refuse to recognize Kosovo.33 
This despite the fact that Spain for example isn’t against secession as long as it’s mutually-
agreed, like in the cases of South-Sudan (2011), Montenegro (2006), East Timor (2002) and 
Eritrea(2000). The default position of Spain on unilateral secession however is to refuse 
recognition, since it may create a legal precedent for the Catalonian or Basque cases.34 It 
proves that political considerations clearly play a key role when separatists try to acquire 
external self-determination through a unilateral act of secession. 
Besides the justification that separatist movements need from abroad, they also need to 
convince the public of their regions that secession is desirable. Most of the separatist 
movements that operate within the EU do so by democratic means, which obviously means 
that they would need votes and political influence to achieve their objectives.35 The 
arguments used to acquire these votes can be quite diverse case-to-case, but often are 
based upon similar elements. As was already discussed, historical-cultural arguments, or the 
reference to a regional ‘imagined community’ are often portrayed as ‘evidence’ that a 
certain (regional) group of people is different from the national community. These 
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 Allen Buchanan, Theories of Secession, in: Philosophy & Public Affairs, (1997) Vol.26(1), p.31-61 
31
 Ersun N. Kurtulus, State Sovereignty: Concept, Phenomenon, and Ramifications, (New York, 2005) p. 99-104 
32
 ‘A permanent population, a defined territory, government and capacity to enter into relations with other 
states’ are among the legal criteria of statehood according to Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on 
Rights and Duties of States. See: Ersun N. Kurtulus, State Sovereignty, p.88-95 
33
 Cristopher Borgen, From Kosovo to Catalonia, p.1001-1002 
34
 Keith Medhurst, (MA thesis) Secession and Accession, p.50 
35
 Bruno Coppieters, Secessionist Conflicts in Europe, p.242 
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arguments, which can be labeled as ‘emotional’, often produce a ‘us-against-them’ discourse 
in which separatist politicians operate. A fine example of such an ‘emotional’ argument is 
given by the Catalonian CiU: ‘Catalunya és una nació mil·lenària… No som un invent de fa 
quatre dies… sinó que Catalunya és una nació que existeix des de fa més de mil 
anys.’36Although the influence of such arguments is presumably limited, they certainly do 
win votes given the success of similar arguments by (national) populist politicians.37  
 Political arguments often are phrased in a similar manner: ‘Decisions about 
Scotland… should be taken in Scotland’38, ‘Onze eigen problemen aanpakken met onze eigen 
oplossingen en onze eigen centen’39, ‘L’estat espanyol diu no a tots els plantejaments fets des 
de Catalunya’40. Since these types of arguments are at the very core of the political discourse 
of separatist parties and the quoted parties all are the biggest parties within their elective 
bodies, the influence of such arguments surely shouldn’t be underestimated.  
 Finally, economic arguments play an very important role in gathering votes. Especially 
in economic harsh times it appears effective to claim that a region would be economically 
better off if it were to become an independent nation. Scottish separatists emphasize that 
they share the revenue of Scottish oil with the rest of the UK, Catalonian separatists 
emphasize that they could escape the misery and unemployment rates of the Spanish 
economy by becoming independent and Flemish separatists argue that they shouldn’t be 
paying the bill for the Walloons anymore. These three cases aren’t unique, in many of 
Europe’s wealthy regions voices are raised for separatism, albeit with diverging success 
rates. Not surprisingly, regions such as Flanders, Catalonia, Bavaria and Northern-Italy are 
among the most-developed and wealthiest regions of their countries. When times get rough 
economically, separatists can therefore convince many people that it is not just that they’re 
paying the bill for the entire country or that their region would be much better off if it were 
to become independent.  
 
Chapter review and conclusions 
Thus, when taking European separatism into account, several conclusions can be made 
following this analysis. First of all, in all cases of European separatism a regional imagined 
community exists. In most cases however, these communities possess internal self-
determination, allowing them to speak their language, practice their culture in a meaningful 
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way and to participate in politics. External self-determination, which entails the acquirement 
of sovereignty by a region or community, is a more complicated phenomenon. Sometimes it 
is acquired by mutual accord between the seceding region and the central state, but in other 
cases unilateral secession by the region occurs. When this happens, many factors come in to 
play to determine whether the secession is successful or not.  Even though there are some 
legal principles in international law that relate to unilateral secession, these only apply to 
narrowly-defined situations and then still see unilateral secession as a last resort. Above all, 
international political support is crucial for the success of secession, since unilateral 
secession can be interpreted as a domestic issue in which foreign actors are not allowed to 
intervene. Therefore, only when a seceding region acquires international recognition it can 
truly become a new, sovereign state. The decision to recognize a country or not is however 
often based upon political considerations and separatist movements therefore require 
justification, which can either consist of a just cause or a free choice. Secession also has to be 
justified vis-à-vis the population of the seceding region, which is done by democratic means 
with emotional, political, and economic arguments. 
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In the first part, separatism as a phenomenon and the act of secession were analysed. The 
framework that evolved from the conclusions of that analysis shall now be used to approach 
the three crucial cases of this thesis: Scotland, Catalonia and Flanders. The elements of the 
imagined communities of these regions will be summarized, the justification of separatist 
movements will be mapped, and the actual prospects of secession and international 
recognition thereafter will be considered. Above all however, this part will introduce the 
context of the European Union to these three cases of separatist movements. What are the 
attitudes of these separatist movements towards the EU? Why is it that these movements 
strive to gain national independence whilst seeking to remain subordinate to an even 
greater, supra-national order? In short, the role that the EU has in the development of these 
separatist movements will be at the core of the analyses of these three cases.  
 
Chapter II: Scotland 
 
Background 
Scotland, or Alba as it is called in Gàidhlig, has had a longer history as an independent 
kingdom than most of the European states. Many Scots like to trace their history back to 9th 
century, when the Picti and Scoti tribes ended their mutual hostility and formed the 
Kingdom of Scotland. No matter what the exact starting point of Scottish history is, the 
history of Scotland is heavily entangled with that of its southern neighbour: England. 
Throughout Medieval times the two kingdoms often waged war on each other and at times 
even Norwegian armies would join the mixture of medieval warfare. At last a Scottish king, 
James VI, would succeed to the English throne, thereby bringing the two kingdoms under 
one throne in 1603. The 1707 Act of Union then proceeded to abolish the parliament of 
Scotland in favour of the one in Westminster, and marked the beginning of Great Britain.41 
 Presumably, ever since the Act of Union, some Scots have resented their loss of 
sovereignty. The interpretation of the 1707 Act of Union still remains topic of debate, in 
which some claim that it was merely admitted Scottish representatives to the Parliament of 
England whilst others are convinced that it installed ‘unlimited parliamentary sovereignty at 
the hands of an executive that was barely accountable to the Scottish electorate’.42 
Nevertheless, the original Act of Union is ambiguous. In some articles it refers to Scotland as 
‘that part of the United Kingdom now called Scotland’ whilst in other articles it refers to ‘the 
Kingdom of Scotland’.43 This ambiguity convinced Lord Cooper in 1953 to launch a legal 
analysis of the Act of Union that questioned the very competence of the UK parliament over 
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Scotland.44           
 At any rate, the Scottish National Party (SNP) was founded in 1934. The party 
struggled to justify its existence, as it was internally divided and didn’t manage to win any 
seats in the Westminster parliament during the first decade of its existence. There was no 
clarity to what the party actually wanted to achieve, as the party was internally divided into 
fundamentalists (who wanted outright independence) and gradualists (who wanted to 
achieve more regional autonomy through policies such as devolution). Decades later, during 
the 1970s, the SNP would acquire better electoral results, peaking in the 1974 elections with 
11 seats at Westminster. However, in 1979 a referendum was called in which the 
establishment of a separate Scottish Assembly could have been achieved. The referendum 
failed though, since the required 40% of yes-votes among the Scottish electorate wasn’t 
acquired. The SNP appeared to have lost its raison d’être, since the people of Scotland 
apparently weren’t in favour of more political independence vis-à-vis Westminster.45
 Remarkably enough, the first steps towards more Scottish autonomy weren’t 
initiated by the SNP, but came from the hands of Labour. Tony Blair’s Labour won the 
elections in 1997, after having made promises for referenda on devolution. The Scottish 
referendum resulted in a yes-vote, after which a Scottish Parliament was established at 
Holyrood from where it had the competence to make primary legislation in areas that 
weren’t reserved. Although the SNP had actively campaigned for yes-votes in the devolution-
referendum, the outcome was ‘a blessing and a curse’ for them. Again, the raison d’être of 
the SNP was questioned. How relevant would a pro-independence party be in a devolved 
parliament? Labour’s George Robertson expected that devolution would ‘kill nationalism 
stone dead’.46           
 The SNP did appear to have a slight set-back in electoral success, remaining in the 
role of an opposition party for nearly a decade. In 2007 however, the party managed to win 
the elections and formed the first (minority) Nationalist Government. Even more remarkable 
though was the landslide victory that the SNP managed in the next-term elections of 2011. 
In these elections, the SNP acquired 69 of the 129 seats of the Scottish parliament, giving 
them an absolute majority to govern and to call for an independence referendum.47 The call 
this referendum resulted in negotiations between the Scottish devolved government and the 
UK government, and lead to the ‘Edinburgh agreement’ of 2012. In this agreement both 
governments agreed to the terms of the referendum and assured that they would respect 
the outcome of the referendum at any rate.48 Such is the long historical background of the 
independence referendum that will take place in Scotland this year.    
 Whilst writing this thesis, the referendum polls showed that the Scottish were likely 
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to vote against independence, although the differences between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ voters were 
rather small and a significant part of the electorate still hadn’t decided yet.49 Regardless of 
the possible outcome of this referendum, it is a fact that Scotland might choose to end the 
existence of the United Kingdom through secession. Therefore the separatist movement in 
Scotland has the most realistic prospects compared to other European movements in 
achieving its ultimate goal: secession. September 18th, 2014 will show whether the Scots 
truly want to replace their British passports with Scottish ones. 
 
The case for Scottish independence 
The Scottish National Party truly is the only European separatist movement that has already 
written an entire ‘blueprint’ for independence. In its ‘Guide to an Independent Scotland’ the 
SNP elaborates on how Scotland would be as an independent nation and what the apparent 
benefits of independence would be. Although the SNP presents the document as a ‘guide’, it 
clearly is a ‘political and constitutional manifesto… rather than a neutral expert analysis’.50 
Indeed, one doesn’t have to go through all 670 pages to realise that the authors of this 
document, the Scottish Government (i.e. the SNP), clearly try to convince readers that they 
should vote ‘yes’ in the independence referendum. Therefore the White Paper (as the Guide 
is also called) does provide us with a valuable source on what the SNP presents as its 
arguments for secession, since the justification of the SNP for secession has already been 
published. It remains to be seen though whether this justification is nothing more than a 
political manifesto, or whether the arguments used by the SNP are actually based upon 
facts.             
 The Guide to an Independent Scotland can be summarized into several main 
arguments. Firstly, the Guide emphasizes political arguments that could be achieved through 
independence. The ‘people of Scotland’ would decide for Scotland rather than leaving 
political ‘decisions at the hands of others’.51 This independent decision-making in turn would 
allow Scotland to ‘control our own resources and make our own decisions about our 
economy’, which clearly refers to the economic arguments that run through the Guide. Other 
political arguments include the proposed removal of British nuclear submarines from 
Scottish naval bases, and the position of an independent Scotland within international 
organizations, such as independent membership of NATO52 and the EU. Despite seceding 
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from the United Kingdom, the SNP assumes that Scotland would become the 54th member of 
the Commonwealth and would retain the British monarch as head of state.53  
 The economic arguments are based upon the assumption that the Scots in general 
pay more taxes per capita than the UK average, but receive less public spending in ratio to 
GDP than the UK as a whole. This ‘healthier’ financial position should in turn allow an 
independent Scottish government to realise some of the SNP’s primary goals: the 
transformation of the childcare system, the abolishment of the ‘bedroom tax’ and 
competitive business taxation.54 Moreover, independence would allow Scotland to develop 
itself economically without the ‘risks’ of the UK economy, which is depicted as instable and 
‘one of the most unequal economic models of the developed world’. Outside this system, 
Scotland should be able to provide better employment chances for its youth, to avoid the 
necessity of raising taxes and to invest in transport, which is displayed to be solely focussed 
on London and south-east England by Westminster.55  Despite placing Scotland outside of 
the UK ‘system’ though, the SNP expects to retain the pound sterling as currency and the 
Bank of England as lender of last resort. 56       
 Above all however, the emphasis in this Guide is on ‘controlling resources’. What 
these resources exactly are isn’t hard to figure out; even though there are references to 
‘food and drink, energy, creative industries, tourism and life sciences’. Obviously energy, i.e. 
the North Sea oil, is the main argument with which the SNP hopes to gather enough yes-
votes. In their Guide, the SNP estimates that the Scottish GDP per capita would be one-fifth 
higher if Scotland wouldn’t have to share the revenue of Scottish oil with the rest of the 
UK.57 Control over the revenue generated by oil in Scottish waters is one of the most 
important arguments for independence that is brought forward by the SNP. Comparisons to 
Norway are made throughout the entire Guide, depicting that country as a country that can 
offer its citizens so much wealth because it controls its own (large) oil reserves in the North 
Sea.             
 Some emotional arguments are offered as well. The Guide states that ‘the eyes of the 
world will be on Scotland as our nation emerges – again – as an independent country’.58 The 
SNP also proudly boosts that 83% of the people living in Scotland feel that they have a 
Scottish identity, without further specifying what that identity exactly is.59 The Guide also 
claims that an independent Scottish government would be better suited to protect the 
Scottish culture, which is ‘distinct from Westminster’, and even that the Scots wouldn’t have 
to worry about missing their favourite shows since all existing broadcasts would continue to 
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exist. Even the BBC-broadcasts would be continued in a Scottish variant, the SBS.60 These 
clearly are ‘emotional’ arguments.  
 
Emotional arguments Political arguments Economic arguments 
Scotland, an ancient nation, 
should re-acquire 
independent statehood. 
The ‘people of Scotland’ 
should decide for Scotland 
rather than leaving decisions 
at the hands of others.  (i.e.  
full political independence) 
Scotland should control its 
own resources and energy. 
Above all, the revenue 
coming from oil in Scottish 
territorial waters should go 
to Scotland. 
The majority of the Scottish 
people – 83%- feel they have 
a Scottish identity. 
Removal of British nuclear 
weapons from Scottish 
territory. 
The Scottish economy would 
be better off outside the UK 
economic system. 
Independence would allow 
better preserving of the 
distinct Scottish culture. 
Safeguarding Scottish rather 
than British interests in 
international organizations. 
The people of Scotland 
would be wealthier if their 
country were to become 
independent. 
Scotland is treated as an 
unequal partner within the 
UK vis-à-vis England. 
Scotland would acquire an 
independent veto in the EU 
for its vital interests. 
Public investment in 
Scotland would be balanced 
with taxes paid per capita.  
 Avoid being dragged out of 
the EU following a ‘Brexit’. 
An independent Scotland 
would abolish the unpopular 
Poll- and Bedroom Taxes. 
 
Figure B: Overview of the main arguments portrayed by the SNP in their ‘Guide to an independent 
Scotland’  
 
 
The imagined community of Scotland 
As was discussed before, imagined communities or territorial identities always play a role 
within European separatist movements. Scotland obviously has an imagined community as 
well, which shall now be briefly described and analysed in the greater context of Scottish 
separatism. 
The Calman Commission, which was established by opposition parties during the first 
minority National Government of the SNP (2007-2011),61 was tasked to review the 1997 
devolution arrangements of Scotland. In its first report, in December 2008, it dealt in great 
depth with the historical and contextual background to Scottish devolution. Even though the 
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Commission argues against independence (seeking further devolution instead), it 
continuously employs ‘a constant and firm theme of Scotland as a nation’.62 This is central to 
the Scottish territorial identity, it considers itself a nation rather than a region.  This is 
confirmed by a ‘Moreno National Identity’-survey by ScotCen, which asked 1,229 random 
adults whether they felt Scottish, British or some combination of both. Additionally, the 
same respondents were asked to determine on a scale from 1 (low) to 7 (high) how Scottish 
or British they felt. 63 The results show that the Scots feel Scottish rather than British: 
 
 
Figure C: A 2012 survey by ScotCen on the Moreno National Identity question. N = 1.229 
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Figure D: Separate Measures of Scottish and British Identity, from 1 (low sense of Scottish/ British identity) to 7 (high 
sense of Scottish/ British identity). N = 1.229.  
 
The emphasis on Scottish rather than British identity is furthermore confirmed by the 
products of governance in Scotland. In a 2009 study by Murray Leith, multiple of these 
products in several fields of Scottish governance were examined for their terminology. In all 
cases there were many references to the Scottish nation or identity, whilst there were 
almost no references to Britain or ‘Britishness’ as such.64      
 Thus, there is no doubt that a very large part of the population in Scotland feels 
‘Scottish’ rather than ‘British’. The SNP’s assumption that 83% of Scottish citizens feel 
Scottish is fairly accurate compared with these statistics. The Scottish imagined community is 
therefore without doubt firmly established, even though the historical language of Scotland 
(Gàidhlig) is rarely known to the Scots and despite the entanglement of Scottish culture with 
that of the UK. But does identity play a significant role in determining the referendum 
outcome? In other words, is the established Scottish national identity an asset for the 
Scottish separatist movement?          
 In addition to asking respondents about their identity, the ScotCen survey also asked 
its respondents whether they supported Scottish independence. Remarkably, levels of 
support showed only slight differences as the ‘scale’ of identity (1-7) went up. Instead, the 
survey results suggested that support for independence was determined by the extent to 
which respondents felt ‘British’. Therefore, it seems that the affinity with the Scottish 
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identity influences support for Scottish independence less than a ‘low’ sense of attachment 
to British identity:65 
 
 
Figure E: Levels of support for Scottish independence, according to the extent to which a respondent feels British or 
Scottish (1 – 7).  N = 1.229.  
The territorial identity of Scotland is a national identity. A great majority of the population 
feels relates with the Scottish identity, with about 52% of the population feeling only 
Scottish or more Scottish than British (i.e. an exclusive identity). At the very core of the SNP’s 
case for independence lays the idea that nations should be able to govern themselves 
independently, although that is not their most important argument. Scottish identity isn’t a 
justification in itself for external self-determination nor is it a driving force behind the 
separatist movement; rather it provides a basic discourse in which separatist arguments are 
placed. Moreover, the extent to which the people in Scotland can or can’t relate themselves 
with Great Britain seems to have an influence on their decision whether they want to remain 
part of the UK.  
 
It’s Scotland’s oil!  
 
As we saw, economic arguments play a very important role in the SNP’s justification for 
independence. Combined with tax reforms, the oil revenue that currently is shared with the 
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UK is expected to increase Scotland’s GDP per capita by one-fifth. What is the impact of 
these economic arguments though?  
 
 
Figure F: SNP campaign leaflet from 1972.
66
 Although differently phrased, oil revenue remains one the SNP's main 
arguments for independence today. 
According to the ScotCen survey, economic ‘expectations matter above and beyond 
identity’.67 This conclusion is supported by both the survey and more recent polls. For over a 
year, monthly ICM surveys have consistently showed that the Scots are divided over the 
question whether independence would be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for Scotland’s economy.68 The 
ScotCen survey however showed that people who think that Scotland would be ‘a lot better’ 
off economically if independence were to be acquired, are much more likely to support 
independence. These survey results support the hypothesis that economic arguments are 
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the most influential for separatist movements in acquiring popular support, at least they are 
in the Scottish case: 
 
Figure G: Results of the monthly ICM-survey. This chart shows the results of survey with 1002 respondents that was 
published at 11-07-2014.
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Figure H: This figure from the ScotCen survey shows levels of support according to expectations of impact on economy.
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N . 1.229.  
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As the survey shows, People who think that an independent Scotland would be economically 
‘a lot better’ are very likely to support independence, whilst people who expect that the 
Scottish economy would get ‘a lot worse’ are not likely at all to support independence. These 
polls therefore show that economic arguments are the most influential for gathering support 
for external self-determination in the Scottish case.  
 
Scotland and the EU 
Many of the SNP’s arguments for independence are directly or indirectly related to Scottish 
membership of the EU. Especially the political and economic arguments of the Scottish 
justification are dependent upon EU membership. The SNP and the Scottish people know 
this, and therefore the SNP often emphasizes that an independent Scotland would remain 
part of the EU. European leaders (both in Brussels and in national capitals) have made it 
clear though that a seceding state would not automatically remain part of the EU. Moreover, 
some of the prospects of EU-membership are impossible to match with the SNP’s blueprint 
of Scottish independence. Is the EU merely a political tool for the SNP to reassure voters that 
independence wouldn’t change their lives negatively? Alternatively, could one argue that 
Brussels is simply the preferable alternative to London for Scottish separatists?   
As we saw, the economic arguments are at the very core of the SNP’s justification. Obviously, 
economic cooperation and the single market are still at the core of EU competencies and are 
therefore very important for an independent Scotland that wishes to remain part of the EU. 
However, the SNP’s Guide is based upon many assumptions that seem beyond the 
competence of the Scottish Government, even if they were fully sovereign, to realize 
unilaterally.            
 First of all, the SNP believes that it can retain many of the British opt-outs under the 
principle of continuity of effect. These include opt-outs from the Eurozone, the Schengen 
area and even a share of the UK rebate until 2020.71 The SNP assumes that it can evade the 
obligation to join the Eurozone (Art. 3 TEU) by not fulfilling all of the prerequisites that a 
member state needs before it can implement the euro (Art. 140 TFEU).72 Although the 
example of Sweden, a country that has ‘evaded’ introducing the euro for more than a 
decade now via exactly this method, proves that this could be a realistic option for Scotland, 
the alternatives to the euro are less certain. Above all, the SNP states that an independent 
Scotland could maintain the Pound Sterling as its currency. Although the SNP claims that ‘the 
pound is Scotland’s currency just as much as it is the rest of the UK’s’73, decision-making 
competence about this currency solely belongs to the British government.   
 There are many reasons why Westminster possibly wouldn’t agree to sharing 
sovereignty over their currency with Edinburgh. The fact that Scotland is an economy that 
would be very dependent on exporting energy and resources entails that it would be very 
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vulnerable to changes in the oil price, creating the possibility of asymmetric shocks and thus 
exposing the Sterling currency area to the risk of a similar crisis as the recent Euro-crisis. The 
British government states that it there is no legal principle whatsoever that obliges the rest 
of the UK to continue sharing its currency with an independent Scotland. Moreover, the 
British Chief Secretary of Treasury has advised against sharing the Pound Sterling with an 
independent Scotland, as it would undermine the optimal currency area74 that currently 
exists by breaking apart the fiscal and political union. This in turn would expose both the rest 
of the UK and Scotland to great economic risks.75 Therefore it seems unlikely that the 
Scottish Government will be able to convince the British government to share power over 
Sterling. Especially the Euro-crisis has convinced the British that monetary policy should be 
controlled by one entity rather than multiple.76      
 Thus, only three options seem to remain for an independent Scotland when it comes 
to currency. First of all, Scotland could work to meet the Art. 140 TFEU requirements and 
adopt the euro, even though that would severely increase the costs of trade with the rest of 
the UK due to the ‘hard’ exchange rate of the Pound Sterling. Alternatively, Scotland could 
introduce its own currency. Due to the dependency on exports of energy though, the 
exchange rates of this currency would increase over time, thereby making those same 
exports, which are so essential to the Scottish economy increasingly expensive. This would 
not only harm Scottish industries, but would also present importers of Scottish energy with 
an incentive to import their energy from elsewhere. Finally, Scotland could unilaterally adopt 
the Pound Sterling as a currency (as is the case with the U.S. dollar and the Euro in many 
non-Western countries across the world), but this would entail that they’d have no influence 
at all in monetary policy whilst Scotland does have influence on monetary policy as long as 
it’s part of the UK.          
 Another major problem could be the possible ascension to the Schengen Area. Since 
the UK has as opt-out for the Schengen Treaty, Scotland would be forced to ‘close’ the 
borders with the rest of the UK if it fails to retain the opt-out on Schengen. Border controls 
at the Anglo-Scottish border would obviously be a serious barrier to mutual trade interests, 
would bring along severe costs and would be highly unpopular with people whose lives are 
built around both sides of the border.        
 Finally, the rebate of the EU budget that the UK has successfully negotiated for in 
Brussels would probably be lost to Scotland. The SNP claims that it would get a ‘fair share’ of 
the negotiated rebate, but the British government has made it clear that the Scots should 
expect nothing at all, and would likely contribute to the UK rebate rather than receive from 
it. The Scottish contribution to the EU-budget would therefore increase by 2.9 billion for the 
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2014-2020 budget.77          
 Throughout the economic arguments it is clear that the SNP believes that Scotland 
would be a wealthier country if it were to be independent. Fundamental to this line of 
thought is however the access to the European single market, which would ensure that 
economic ties to Scotland’s most important trading partner, the rest of the UK,78 wouldn’t 
be severed. However, the access to the single market is portrayed to remain unchanged 
after independence, that is, the SNP assumes it can retain the opt-outs that the UK currently 
has. The entire Scottish economy is currently built within the framework of this special 
British position within the EU. The SNP may argue in favour of leaving the British economic 
system, but Scotland might pay the price of its independence in losing its currency, UK 
rebate share and open borders with the remainder of the UK if it fails to reach agreement 
with London and Brussels. London has already fired several warning shots to indicate that it 
won’t give in easily to these assumptions, whilst reaching unanimous agreement with 28 
member states in Brussels without doing any concessions at all seems rather naïve.  
Some of the political arguments of the SNP that are related to the EU do make an 
understandable case for independence. Not only does the SNP state that Scottish interests 
could be better pursued in Brussels independently, also the possibility of Scotland being 
dragged out of the EU as a part of the UK following the ‘Brexit’-referendum (i.e. the 
referendum called by David Cameron to vote for a British withdrawal from the EU) is widely 
advertised by the SNP as an incentive to vote ‘yes’.79      
 Despite the 2013 ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, in which the British government 
promised to involve the devolved governments in their activities in Brussels,80 the SNP is 
convinced that Scotland could have more influence in Brussels independently. Their claim is 
based upon the belief that smaller member states can ‘punch above their weight’ in Brussels, 
an assumption which indeed is supported by political reality.81In terms of representation at 
EU institutions, Scotland could expect a similar number of MEPs as Finland, which has a 
comparable population size. As long as Art. 17(5) TEU82 is not put in effect Scotland can 
expect to send one Commissioner to Brussels at all times, like any member state. Without 
any doubt Scotland would have more influence in Brussels as an independent member state 
than it would have as a region. 
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EU Membership: a contested bone 
 
“The EU is founded on the Treaties which apply only to the Member States who have agreed 
and ratified them. If part of the territory of a Member State would cease to be part of that 
state because it were to become a new independent state, the Treaties would no longer 
apply to that territory. In other words, a new independent state would, by the fact of its 
independence, become a third country with respect to the EU and the Treaties would no 
longer apply on its territory.”83 
 
The text above is an extract from an official letter of the Commission president José Manuel 
Barroso in response to an ‘invite’ from Lord Tugendhat to contribute to the ‘inquiry into “The 
Economic Implications for the United Kingdom of Scottish Independence.” It seems odd that 
Barroso ‘contributes’ to this ‘inquiry’, since it appears to be an ‘internal’ British debate. 
Barroso does confirm that ‘it is not the role of the European Commission to express a position 
on questions of internal organisation related to the constitutional arrangements of a 
particular Member State.’ 84Nevertheless, Barroso grasps the opportunity to send a clear 
warning signal towards all regions that are pursuing independent statehood within the EU: if 
you secede you will no longer be in the Union. More recently, in February 2014, Barroso 
repeated that warning by stating in an TV-interview with BBC’s Andrew Marr that “In case 
there is a new country, a new state, coming out of a current member state it will have to 
apply” for EU-membership, which in turn would be “extremely difficult, if not impossible”.85
 Remarks like these make the official position of the outgoing Barroso-Commission 
crystal clear: new Member States can only join the Union through the ordinary Accession 
procedure, Art. 49 TEU, which entails a long and cumbersome procedure that often takes 
many years. Even if a newly-emerging country has been implementing Union legislation for 
many decades, like all our three cases have, it will likely take a lot of work and time to prove 
that a country satisfies the full acquis communautaire. Moreover, the Accession Treaty 
which has to be ratified by all 28 existing Member States may be the result of lengthy 
negotiations during which a region like Scotland might have to fight tough battles to 
maintain the UK opt-outs. The official EU-stance therefore is to consider independent 
Scottish EU-membership as something which isn’t self-evident. Another serious warning shot 
could be interpreted in the recent statement by the upcoming Commission President Jean 
Claude Juncker, who suggested that no new Member States would be allowed to join the EU 
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for at least five years.86         
 Another clear sign that Scotland may have to negotiate its way back in the Union 
came from the Spanish Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, who at a press conference stated 
that ‘if a “region” opted to leave a member state, then it would remain “outside the 
European Union.” Rajoy then continued to state that “it would require the agreement of all 
28 EU-members before it was allowed to join.” 87Although the words of Rajoy must certainly 
be interpreted within the Spanish context – an implicit warning to Catalonia- they do make 
clear that Scotland doesn’t have to expect a smooth entry into independent EU-membership 
as far as some of Europe’s political leaders are concerned. 
This image, rather grim for Scottish separatists, is in great contrast to what the SNP itself 
envisages for what they call a smooth transition into becoming an independent EU Member 
State.88 The SNP has released their own ‘fast-track’ towards independent EU-membership 
after rumours of ejection from the EU first appeared. This fast-track approach envisages a 
revision of the existing Treaties through Art. 48 TEU, which would simply allow Scotland to 
be included in the Treaties as an independent Member State rather than a part of the UK. A 
revision of the existing Treaties under Art. 48 TEU would nevertheless also require 
agreement and ratification by all 28 Member States, but the SNP is confident that this can be 
done through negotiations and well in time before ‘Independence Day’, which is planned at 
26th of March, 2016, if the independence referendum results in a ‘yes’-vote.89 
The outcome of this debate is extremely relevant for all European separatists, since the 
Scottish case will most likely set the precedent for potential other cases. There is no 
precedent in EU-history in which part of an existing Member State seceded from that state 
whilst trying to remain part of the EU (or its predecessors). The Treaties do not provide any 
guidance on the specific situation of secession from an existing Member State, leaving the 
outcome open to different interpretations and political decision-making.  
 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, a professor of European Law at the University of Oxford, has 
argued that there is enough legal leeway in the Treaties to make the Scottish ‘fast-track’ 
possible. According to him, Art.2 TEU and Art. 4(3) TEU provide sufficient legal foundation 
for negotiating Scotland into the EU. Whilst Art. 2 TEU90 emphasizes the value of democracy, 
Art. 4(3) TEU underlines the ‘principle of sincere cooperation’, calling upon Member States to 
facilitate the achievement of the Union’s objectives and tasks. Douglas-Scott argues that 
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Scotland would make a legal, democratic choice to become an independent country and that 
the value of their democratic choice should therefore be facilitated by the Union and its 
Member States.91 Moreover, the Treaties should be interpreted not only literally, but also in 
‘their spirit and general scheme’.92         
 Despite this legal ‘obligation’ (which remains an interpretation!) to be cooperative 
towards the Scottish fast-track, the EU and Member States can’t be forced to comply with 
the Scottish fast-track. Officially, in the event of a ‘yes’-vote in the referendum Scotland 
would remain part of the UK until independence day in 2016. This entails that Scotland, still 
a region in the meantime, officially can’t apply for membership or even enter into 
negotiations without the grace of London, since the British government will remain the only 
entity within the UK that can agree to international treaties and agreements. Regions can’t 
engage in diplomacy, especially since Foreign Affairs are a reserved competence in the UK. 
Negotiating with Scotland before Independence Day could be explained as meddling with 
internal British affairs, which conflicts with the principle of territorial integrity. Even the 
Edinburg Agreement, which includes a commitment ‘to work constructively in the light of the 
outcome, whatever it is’ doesn’t oblige the British government to allow Scotland access to 
the reserved Foreign Affairs competence.93       
 There are clear political and economic interests to keep Scotland in the Union. 
Scotland has been in the Union for over 40 years, a period long enough to build up 
significant foreign interests in Scotland. Foreign investments, international students, 
European fishing fleets in Scottish waters; they’re mere examples of reasons why it would be 
in nobody’s interest to eject Scotland from the Union on the day they would become 
independent. Earlier-mentioned comments by Commission President Barroso and Spanish 
Prime Minister Rajoy suggested that an independent Scotland would ‘automatically’ be 
outside of the Union, but Scotland’s entanglement with the rest of the Union means that 
millions of EU-citizens would lose many of their rights overnight if Scotland were to be 
‘ejected’. Douglas-Scott argues that the nature of EU-citizenship would make it impossible to 
place Scottish citizens outside of the Union overnight.94 Moreover, in these times of 
Euroskepticism the EU would be shooting its own foot if it were to ban a rather pro-
European population from the EU for making a democratic decision. Therefore it doesn’t 
seem likely that Scotland would be placed outside the Union without any kind of transitional, 
interim arrangement until it could re-join again.       
       
Although the outcome of the debate remains uncertain, it seems likely that Scotland would 
be allowed to become a Member State at some point not too distance from their 
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Independence Day, and would not be placed at ‘the back of the queue behind Serbia, 
Montenegro and Macedonia’ as David Cameron has claimed.95 There are very serious doubts 
that the Scottish ‘fast-track’ is likely to succeed though, since unanimity is required and 
multiple Member States have good political incentives to scare off their own separatist 
movements by presenting Scotland with a though road to independent EU-membership. 
Spain alone will probably never accept the Scottish Art.48-procedure, but even member 
states without separatist movements – The Netherlands for example-  have refrained from 
choosing sides in the debate, arguing that an official position on the issue would have to be 
decided upon by the 'EU and all its member states' if the Scots would choose for 
independence.96 This above all suggests that Scotland would have to convince all the 
member states by itself, since it doesn’t have to expect too many allies for their fast-track 
procedure. And regardless of which procedure will be used, Scotland is likely to lose some of 
the current UK opt-outs along the route to independent membership.97 At any rate, the 
outcome of the debate will be anticipated anxiously by separatists in Edinburgh, Barcelona, 
Antwerp and in many other European cities, as it will likely set the norm for future cases. 
 
Chapter Review and Conclusion 
 
This chapter dealt at great length with the Scottish case for independence. The movement 
(SNP), the imagined community and its justification were thoroughly analysed. Although the 
majority of the Scots feel related to some national Scottish identity, providing an emotional 
base for separatism, it is their sense of ‘Britishness’ that seems to have more influence on 
their decision to support independence or not. Above all however, economic expectations 
appear to have a clear link with support for independence, underlining that economic 
arguments are the SNP’s most important tool.      
 When it comes to independence and the EU, many debates are still far from 
concluded and much uncertainty remains. Although it seems likely that an independent 
Scotland could join the EU at some point, it remains to be seen when and more importantly 
under which conditions. There are convincing indications that Scotland would have to re-
apply for Membership from outside the Union, although some interim arrangements would 
be in everyone’s interest. Maintaining the UK’s opt-outs is far from certain for Scotland, 
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since the UK and other Member States have no incentive to give in easily to the SNP’s 
assumptions about opt-outs on currency, Schengen and the UK rebate.  
Thus, faced with enormous political struggles and un-cooperative attitudes from Member 
States and the EU itself towards their independent EU-membership, why is the SNP so 
supportive of EU-membership? Why does Edinburgh wants to get rid of London whilst 
embracing Brussels?          
 For Scotland, the answer lies in the fact that the SNP assumes that the EU can 
preserve certain important parts of the status quo, even as Scotland leaves the UK. The 
European single market ensures that economic ties with Scotland’s most important trading 
partners wouldn’t be severed and that Scottish citizens wouldn’t be cut off from the rest of 
the UK and Europe when trying to travel, work or study. The EU in other words, is a safety 
valve that ensures that Scotland wouldn’t have to share political competences or oil revenue 
with London anymore, whilst all the good things of being part of the UK and Europe would 
remain. The EU guarantees the best parts of the status quo for Scotland.   
 However, it is unlikely that the SNP would be able to preserve the UK status quo since 
their ‘blueprint’ for independence is built around certain assumptions that aren’t realistic in 
the UK and EU context. The SNP claims it can be in a joint currency union with the UK to 
retain the Pound Sterling as currency, but the British government has made it clear that it is 
not willing to cooperate to that thought. Simultaneously, it seems naïve to expect that 28 
Member States would allow Scotland to maintain all the British opt-outs as a new EU-
member. Without opt-outs on the Eurozone and the Schengen Treaty, Scotland would be 
isolated economically from the rest of the UK. It is therefore hard to believe that the SNP 
would support EU-membership if it meant that Scotland would have to introduce the euro 
and join Schengen. The Scottish separatist movement therefore only supports EU-
membership on its own conditions, which guarantee the current opt-out status quo. 
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Chapter III: Catalonia 
 
Background 
 
“Catalonia, New European State” – 2012 Catalonian Protest Banner 
 
On July 10, 2010 over a million people crowded the streets of Barcelona to protest against 
the opinion of a Spanish constitutional court that was issued the day before.98 The court had 
spent several years trying to find the answer to the question whether the 2006 Catalonian 
Autonomy Statue was in line with the Spanish constitution or not. The court opinion - which 
embodied a very lengthy opinion of 683 pages- ruled that 14 of the 277 articles of the 
Catalonian Autonomy Statute were inadmissible with the Spanish constitution. Most 
importantly, the court ruled that “The interpretation of… “Catalonia as a nation”, and 
references to “the national reality of Catalonia” … have no legal effect”, and that the Catalan 
language should not take precedence over Castilian Spanish.99 The result was that many 
Catalonians argued that “autonomy within Spain was no longer feasible; separation was 
required to defend their language, their culture, their national identity.”100 In other words, 
the Catalonian protesters argued that their internal self-determination was breached by the 
opinion of the constitutional court, and that external self-determination would now be the 
only means for their imagined community to exist.      
 That the outrage of the Catalonian imagined community didn’t fade away after the 
huge protests became clear on September 11, 2012: Catalonia’s national day,101 when 
approximately 1.5 million people from all over Catalonia took over the centre of Barcelona in 
a huge separatist rally. Faced with the consequences of the financial crisis, the Catalonians 
protested against budget cuts in public services for which they blamed Madrid. 102 Exactly 
one year later, an estimated 1.6 million people would preserve the protest by forming the 
‘Catalan Way’, a human chain that ran from French border to the regional border with 
Valencia, thereby mimicking the Baltic Chain that rallied for national independence in 
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1989.103 September 11th, 2014, the three-hundredth anniversary of the fall of Barcelona, 
witnessed equally epic demonstrations for independence.104    
 If one takes into account that the population of Catalonia consists of merely 7.5 
million people,105 the numbers of protesters that showed up in Barcelona are incredible. If 
the estimated 1.5 million protesters for the 2012 rally are correct, then one out of every five 
Catalonians would have been on the streets of Barcelona that day to protest for Catalonian 
independence. In relative terms of protesters per capita that would equal to 13 million 
protesters in Paris or 63 million protesters in Washington D.C.! With such huge, active 
popular support and rallies like these, the Catalonian case truly seems unique within 
European separatism. Moreover, it underlines that separatism in Catalonia is a grass-roots 
movement with great popular support instead of an elite-driven political one.  
 Recently, protests in Kiev which saw estimations of 400.000 to 800.000 protesters 
have led to revolution and civil war.106 In Catalonia, where at least twice as many people 
marched the streets of Barcelona, nothing revolutionary has happened. Yet. On 9 November, 
2014, the Catalonian regional government plans on organizing an independence 
referendum. 
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Figure I : Photo of the 2014 Independence rally in Barcelona. Note the Scottish flag in the background: Catalan separatists 
follow the Scottish referendum with great interest.
107 
To understand the nature of the protests we would have to go back to November 2003, 
when José Zapatero was amidst his election campaign for Prime Minister (PM) of Spain. He 
promised a crowd in Barcelona that he would support “any reform of the Catalan Statute for 
Autonomy approved by the Catalan Parliament”, a promise he further enriched by reciting a 
verse of the popular poet Miquel Martí I Pol, in Catalan. In the event Zapatero astonished 
the Catalonians, who showed their trust in Zapatero by giving him a historical election 
success in Catalonia just days after. Zapatero was elected Prime Minister and kept his word: 
just two years later an astonishing 90% of the Catalan parliament approved the reformed 
Statute of Autonomy which defined Catalonia as a nation. After the new Statute became law 
in 2006 however, the centre-right Partido Popular claimed that the Statute was ‘a dagger 
aimed at the heart of the constitution’, and brought the case before the constitutional court. 
It was the opinion of this court in 2010 which enflamed the first massive independence 
rally.108           
 Catalonian prospects got even worse when Mariano Rajoy of the Partido Popular (PP) 
was elected Spanish PM in 2011. Indeed, the party that challenged the Autonomy Statute at 
a constitutional court in 2006 now holds a majority of the seats in both the Spanish Congress 
                                                          
107
 The Guardian, Catalans protest over independence on National Day – in pictures, (12-09-2014) accessed at 
17-09-2014) via: http://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2014/sep/12/catalans-protest-over-
independence-on-national-day-in-pictures 
108
 World Affairs, The Domain of Spain: How Likely is Catalan Independence?, (January/ February 2014) 
accessed at 07-08-2014 via: http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/domain-spain-how-likely-catalan-
independence 
42 
 
of Deputies and the Senate, giving them absolute power at the national level. In Catalonia 
meanwhile, the governing party of the regional Catalonian government – Convergència i 
Unió (CiU)– embraced separatism in 2012 and called elections to find electoral support for 
an independence referendum. Although the move backfired for the CiU and they lost some 
seats, the other major pro-independence party – Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
(Republican left of Catalonia – ERC) – doubled its seats.109 Nevertheless, the CiU and the ERC 
put their ideological differences aside and agreed on a partnership that would allow the CiU 
to govern whilst organizing an independence referendum.110 Together these two parties do 
possess 53% of the seats in the Catalonian parliament, giving them a simple majority. Under 
the leadership of the regional president, Artur Mas, the CiU and the ERC have agreed to 
organize an independence referendum in Catalonia on November 9th, 2014. The referendum, 
which is considered ‘unconstitutional’ and therefore ‘illegal’ by parliament and the central 
government in Madrid,111 will ask the Catalans two questions: ‘Do you want Catalonia to 
become a state?’ and ‘Do you want Catalonia to become an independent state?’.112 
 
The imagined community of Catalonia 
 
“Som una nació. Nosaltrem decidim.” 
‘We are a nation. We decide.’ – Catalonian Protest slogan. 
There can be no doubt that the Catalan imagined community possesses a national territorial 
identity.113 The Catalans have a rich history in which they can look back upon a great 
Medieval empire and were de facto an independent country until 1714.114 Above all, the 
Catalans possess their own Catalan language, which often was and still is at the centre of 
political battles between Barcelona and Madrid. During Franco’s dictatorship an attempt was 
made to eradicate the use of the Catalan language in public spaces,115 after which it took 
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until 1983 for Catalan to re-appear in public sectors such as education.116 Ever since the 
1983 reform, the use of the Catalan language has been increasing alongside with the support 
for Catalonian independence. Figueras and Masella therefore argue that this linguistic 
education can be ‘interpreted as an example of nation-building policy within Catalonia’.117 At 
any rate, the Catalan language can be seen as the core of the Catalonian imagined 
community, as it gives Catalonians an everyday-language (inclusion) that is notably different 
from that of the rest of Spain (differentiation). This entails that Catalonia is a distinctive 
region within Spain, that is considered to be an exclusive national minority by Brigevich.118
 The role of identity and language can hardly be exaggerated in the Catalonian 
separatist case. A survey from September 2012 by the Spanish Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas (CIS) underlines the national identity sentiments in Catalonia: 
 
Figure J : Identity sentiments in Catalonia, according to a 2012 CIS-survey. N = 1186.
119
 
 
When it comes to identity, there can be no doubt that Catalonians feel more Catalan than 
Spanish. A slight majority of the population, 51.1% according to the CIS-survey, feels only 
Catalan or more Catalan than Spanish. Another 34.3% consider themselves equally Catalan 
and Spanish and for only 12.9% of the inhabitants of Catalonia the Spanish identity takes 
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precedence. These percentages are however similar to those in Scotland, where national 
sentiments haven’t led to massive independence rallies as they did in Catalonia. A key 
difference between the Scottish and Catalan identities is the wide-spread use of the Catalan 
language. Whereas the Scottish Gaelic is hardly known to the Scots, the Catalan language 
has been on the rise for decades and its public use is widespread nowadays. The Catalonian 
government communicates primarily in Catalan (although Spanish and often even English 
translations are always available),120 education is in both Catalan and Spanish, many people 
watch Catalan TV news and,121 above all, a large part of the Catalans considers Catalan to be 
their own language. Unlike Scotland, Catalonia is a proper bilingual region:  
 
Figure K: Survey results to the question "What language do you consider your own?" in the 2012 CIS-survey. N = 1186.
122
 
 
Bilingualism in Europe doesn’t necessarily lead to separatism. There are plenty of examples 
to be found where linguistic minorities do not spawn significant separatist movements (think 
of the Swedish-speaking minorities in Finland, or the Bretons in France). On the other hand, 
the Russian-speaking minorities in Eastern-Ukraine and the Baltic States or a country such as 
Belgium (which shall be subject of consideration in the next chapter) show that linguistic 
differences can evolve into separatism. As we saw before, some academics consider 
language a key element of internal self-determination. We also saw that since the 2010 
Constitutional Court ruling, many Catalonians feel that this internal self-determination has 
been breached and that secession is required to defend their language, culture and national 
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identity.123 Language and identity therefore, cornerstones of the imagined community, are at 
the core of Catalonian separatism. 
The imagined community is crucial to the Catalan separatists, more than it is in Scotland. In 
Scotland the struggle for independence takes place within the framework of a legal debate, 
kick-started by political parties that campaign for the votes of the Scottish people who then 
democratically decide about independence (the free choice justification). The Catalan case 
offers quite a different picture. Instead of choosing for a richer and fairer country (as the SNP 
argues), the Catalan separatists argue that secession is the only way for the Catalan 
imagined community to survive. Moreover, the Catalan separatist movement is more of a 
grass-roots popular movement that propels independence as a cause through popular 
support rather than by one or more political parties. One of the most important separatist 
parties today, the CiU, only started supporting independence after the 2012 independence 
protests. The fact that the CiU’s change of heart came two years after the first major 
independence protest underlines that the Catalan separatist movement originates from the 
Catalan imagined community rather than from political parties. This is further confirmed by 
the unofficial independence referendums that were organised by approximately one-half of 
the Catalan municipalities between 2009 and 2011. These referendums were ‘organized 
mainly from the civil society’ and quickly evolved into ‘a social movement in favour of the 
‘right to decide’.124 More than in Scotland, separatism is a people’s movement in Catalonia. 
Not surprisingly, levels of support for independence are highest among individuals who 
associate themselves with the imagined community the most: 
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Figure L: "If tomorrow a referendum was held to decide about the independence of Catalonia, what would you vote?" 
The Barometer CEO-652 asked this question to 2500 participants who had also indicated their sense of identity. N = 
2500.
125
 
What this survey also makes very clear however is that people who associate themselves only, more 
or equally with their Spanish identity are very likely to be opposed to Catalonian independence. This 
is similar to the Scottish case, where people who felt more ‘British’ were very likely to be opposed to 
Scottish independence. It is therefore important to remember that the Catalonian population is not 
homogenous. Naturally Catalonia and its capital Barcelona have always attracted citizens from other 
parts of Spain. It can be expected that people who were born outside of Catalonia or whose parents 
were born elsewhere have less association with Catalonia and more with Spain. And indeed, there is 
significant evidence for the hypothesis that individuals with Catalan parents are more likely to 
support independence than those with mixed or immigrant parents, or those who immigrated 
themselves.126           
 What this suggests is that the population of Catalonia, if all people who do not consider 
themselves to be part of the Catalan imagined community weren’t taken into account, is very 
supportive of Catalonian independence. Members of the Catalan imagined community in other 
words, are very likely to be pro-independence whilst the presence of Spaniards from elsewhere 
seemingly balances the odds for independence to some extent. 
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The Catalonian case for independence 
 
Besides the emotional discourse of the Catalan imagined community, that argues that internal self-
determination is impossible in Spain, political and economic arguments are provided by Catalan 
separatists as well. Like in the Scottish case, the separatist parties of Catalonia emphasize that their 
´nation´ (i.e. their imagined community) should have ‘dret a decidir’, the ‘right to decide’.127 This 
basic political argument should be interpreted in its context: ‘dret a decidir’ isn’t just a plea for self-
determination, it also signifies the legal and political battle between Madrid and Barcelona about the 
right to organize referenda. As we saw, Madrid considers the Catalan intentions to organize an 
independence referendum illegal. The Catalan government on the other hand argues that if Scotland 
has the right to decide democratically about its future, Catalonia should be able to do so as well.128In 
short, Catalan separatists argue that they should be allowed to make a democratic choice. Other 
political arguments include, similar to Scotland, the independent membership of international 
organisations like the EU. Strikingly, the separatists campaigned that independence would help 
Catalonia escape from the wide-spread corruption in the Spanish government, another political 
argument, only to find that one of the spiritual national leaders of Catalonia too, Jordi Pujol, was 
found guilty of tax fraud.129 Obviously the corruption argument has been less credible ever since. 
 The economic arguments are of great importance in the Catalan case. Spain has been 
economically crippled by the financial crises since 2008, and is still dealing with the severe 
consequences today. Unemployment rates have been slightly decreasing recently, but are still up at a 
soaring 24,5% of the population, with youth unemployment reaching a staggering 53.5%.130 Although 
Catalonia performs slightly better than the rest of Spain in these statistics, still 23.1% of the Catalan 
working force is unemployed.131  It doesn’t require economic expertise to see that Catalonia is in bad 
economic shape, just as the rest of Spain.       
 Catalonia, with a population of 7.5 million – 16.1% of the entire Spanish population, accounts 
for 19.9% of the Spanish GDP. This in turn makes it the wealthiest of the 17 Autonomous 
Communities in Spain, also in terms of GDP per capita. 132 The Catalans are well aware of their 
economic importance within Spain, but are also very well aware of the fiscal deficit that exists 
between Catalonia and Spain. This fiscal deficit flows from the Spanish taxation system that collects 
tax revenue from all Autonomous Communities at the national level, and then redistributes them to 
the regional level again. Catalonia, as the wealthiest region of Spain, has contributed more taxes to 
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the government in Madrid than it has received national expenditures in return for decades now. 
Basically there is an annual flow of tax money flowing out of Catalonia to other regions in Spain. This 
fiscal deficit has been increasing over the past years: 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Taxes paid 
by Catalonia 
47,786 51,823 57,403 61,812 61,872 
Expenses 
received in 
Catalonia 
33,293 36,910 40,203 45,403 45,329 
Balance -14,493 -15,913 -17,200 -16,409 -16,543 
% GDP 
Catalonia 
-7.9% -8.1% -8.5% -8.4% -8.5% 
 
Figure M : The fiscal deficit of Catalonia vis-à-vis the Spanish public sector, 2006-2010. Unit = million euros. Source: 
Consejo de Diplomacia Pública de Cataluña.
133
 
This fiscal deficit, which exists under the principle of ‘solidarity’ with the rest of Spain according to 
Catalan president Artur Mas,134 has proved to be the perfect economic argument for Catalan 
separatists. Whereas the SNP promises increased wealth through independent control over oil 
revenues, the Catalan parties promise similar things through the fiscal policies of an independent 
Catalonia. In the words of Ivan Serrano: 
“Contemporary Catalan nationalism is a case in point, combining an approach based on cultural 
preservation and the emphasis on the negative effects on welfare levels derived from the fiscal deficit 
with the state as pivoting factors for self-government demands. The question of welfare in the 
Catalan political debate is linked to an alleged fiscal unfair treatment by the state, which would 
return an insufficient share of Catalan revenues. The nationalist argument claims that if the Catalan 
government collected all taxes, and a limit to the fiscal deficit was introduced, this would result in a 
significant increment of the public budget and welfare levels.”135 
The influence of economic arguments is further strengthened by the bad economic situation in Spain 
and Catalonia. Austerity has become the norm in European public spending, and this certainly applies 
to Spain. Starting from 2007, spending by Madrid increased immensely while government revenue 
dropped sharply. At its peak, in 2009, the Spanish deficit accounted for nearly 117 billion Euros, 
which is nearly as much as the GDP of Hungary.136 Ever since, pressured by Brussels, Madrid has been 
performing budget cuts. For Catalonia, this entailed that less government expenditure could be 
expected and that, despite the fiscal deficit, the Catalonian government had to cut its budget as well. 
The (political) inability to do so nearly lead to a complete shutdown of basic public services in 
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2012.137           
 Above all however, many Catalans feel trapped in the economic misery of Spain. When asked 
what they considered the main problem that exists in Catalonia, many Catalans defined economic 
problems: 
‘What is, in your opinion, the main problem that exists in Catalonia nowadays? And the 
second? And the third? (Multiple answers possible, N=1186)138 
Unemployment 62.3% N = 739 
Economic problems 44.4% N = 526 
Politics in general 25.3% N = 297 
Healthcare 12.9% N = 152 
Budget cuts 12.6% N = 149 
 
Figure N : The ‘main problems’ in Catalonia according to the Catalonians. N = 1186. 
What this survey suggests is that people are concerned about the present economic state of 
Catalonia, and that a great deal of them has little confidence in politicians to solve these problems. 
Moreover though, it shows that Catalonians in their present situation are likely to be more open to 
support the economic arguments of the separatists than they would probably be under normal 
economic circumstances. The economic crisis in short, has been strengthening the separatist cause.  
An overview of the most important emotional, political and economic arguments immediately makes 
clear that there are many similar arguments used by Catalonian and Scottish separatists. Although 
the imagined community in Catalonia is likely to pay more attention to emotional arguments since 
their perceived breach of internal self-determination, economic arguments play a very important role 
in this case as well.  
Emotional arguments Political arguments Economic arguments 
Catalonia, as an ancient nation, 
should re-acquire independent 
statehood. 
The Spanish government is 
plagued by corruption. 
The Spanish economy is 
dragging Catalonia down. 
Catalonia would be wealthier if 
independent. 
Independence is the ‘only way’ 
to preserve the Catalan 
language, culture and identity 
(i.e. internal self-
determination). 
Catalonia has a ‘dret a decidir’ : 
a right to decide for its own 
future. (Also interpretable as an 
emotional argument). 
The fiscal deficit costs Catalonia 
a lot of money that could be 
better spent in Catalonia. 
Catalonia isn’t treated as an 
equal partner by Madrid, 
Spain refuses to cooperate with 
many Catalonian proposals. 
Catalonia is hit hard by budget 
cuts that were ordered from 
Madrid. 
Madrid can’t be trusted 
anymore since they struck 
down the Catalan Autonomous 
Statute in 2010. 
 Unemployment rates would be 
better in an independent 
Catalonia. 
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 Unilateral secession and the EU?   
As we saw, Madrid and Barcelona haven’t been able to agree on the legality of the 
organisation of the referendum. Whereas the Catalan regional government has shown 
dedication to organize the referendum, Madrid has kept emphasizing that the vote is illegal 
and will not be allowed to take place. Nevertheless, Catalan president Artur Mas has pledged 
that he would only organize the referendum within the ‘framework of the law’, adding that, 
as a last resort, he might organize an early election instead of the referendum in which the 
Catalan people still be able to choose whether they want independence.139 If these elections 
would be won by the pro-independence parties, Mas only wants to negotiate with Madrid 
about a ‘transition to independence’.140 If these negotiations would then fail, the Catalans 
consider unilateral secession, i.e. declaring independence without the consent of Madrid.
 This is where the situation would become very unpredictable. The Catalans would 
justify their secession as a free choice¸ a democratic choice made by the Catalan people to 
become independent. Madrid would immediately point to Articles 1 and 2 of the Spanish 
constitution, which state that ‘National sovereignty belongs to the Spanish people from 
whom all State powers emanate’ and ‘The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of 
the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards’.141 The Spanish 
government interprets these articles twofold: first of all, Spain can’t be divided territorially, 
and secondly matters of sovereignty can only be decided upon by the ‘Spanish people’ as a 
whole. This interpretation was confirmed by the Spanish Constitutional court as well, that 
ruled that a Catalonian referendum on independence would be ‘illegal’ for these exact 
reasons.142 Both legally and politically, the Catalonian separatists have already lost the battle 
for their ‘dret a decidir’ as far as the referendum is concerned. If the Catalan government 
would ignore these warning shots from Madrid it might even be sent home and see the 
Spanish Guardia Civil move in to replace the Catalan police, a procedure that is allowed 
under Articles 8 and 155 of the Spanish Constitution.143 Although this might seem extreme, 
one should not forget the violent episodes of separatism in the Basque region, where large 
numbers of Guardia Civil are still stationed today, even though ETA has ceased their violent 
activities.          
 Meanwhile, Joan Vintró has argued that there certainly are ways to organize a 
referendum within the framework of the law, but that this should then be considered as a 
consultative referendum or a ‘popular consultation’. Both have no ‘directly effective legal 
consequences’, but nevertheless ‘the verdict of the inquiry could hardly not be politically 
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binding.’144            
 At any rate, it seems impossible for the Catalan separatists to acquire independence 
by means that are recognized as legal by the Spanish government. However, as we saw 
before, the success of unilateral secession depends upon international recognition, which 
entails that political considerations might play a larger role than just legal arguments. If 
Catalonia were to unilaterally declare its independence, it might very much divide Europe’s 
national leaders on the question of recognition. Whereas the Baltic States might be 
sympathetic towards Catalonia’s call for self-determination (having experienced unilateral 
secession from the Soviet-Union themselves in recent history), the states that didn’t 
recognize Kosovar independence will most likely not recognize Catalan independence either. 
 Without international recognition Catalonia would legally remain subject to the 
Spanish government. If Catalonia would unilaterally secede, this could be interpreted as an 
unconstitutional act that violates the Spanish territorial integrity. In a worst case scenario, 
there could be a risk of clashes between the Spanish Guardia Civil and the newly 
independent Catalan law enforcement or military agencies. The Spanish Defence Minister, 
Pedro Morenés has made controversial remarks that were interpreted by some as a warning 
that the Spanish armed force would intervene if the ‘national unity’ were to be at stake.145 
However, despite such suggestive remarks and the current political and legal stalemate 
between Barcelona and Madrid, violent secessionism seems a distant and unlikely 
possibility. 
Membership of the EU would further complicate the situation. The recognition of Catalonia 
alone will prove very difficult if a unilateral secession would occur, but membership to the 
EU would - within the current framework of the Treaties – only be possible with the consent 
of Spain. Whereas the Scottish can be confident that they would in any case be able to apply 
for EU-membership, either through the fast-track or the ordinary accession procedure, the 
Catalans face no such certainty following unilateral secession. Both accession tracks, articles 
48 and 49 TEU, require unanimous agreement among Member States. Spain, which besides 
Catalonia faces two more separatist regions, is not likely to tolerate unilateral secession by 
Catalonia, nor is it likely to accept a unilaterally seceded Catalonia into the EU as an 
independent Member State.          
 Within the current treaty framework, only two scenarios could possibly grant 
Catalonia independent EU-membership. First and obvious: political agreement with Spain on 
a transition towards independence. Even if negotiations between Barcelona and Madrid 
would succeed and independence would be granted, Catalonia would probably face similar 
difficulties towards obtaining EU-membership as Scotland – given that the Scottish case 
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doesn’t create a precedent for the Catalonians before their independence. However, 
successful negotiations between Catalan president Artur Mas and Spanish Prime Minister 
Mariano Rajoy have failed time and time again, giving little hope that a political accord could 
be struck on the Catalonian independence referendum.146 
 
Figure O : A frosty handshake between Catalan president Artur Mas and Spanish PM Mariano Rajoy at their last attempt 
to negotiate about the Catalonian referendum.
147
 
A second scenario would be one where the EU would intervene for Catalonia, using article 7 TEU to 
temporarily suspend Spain’s voting rights in the Council to allow a vote on Catalonian accession, 
through one of the two tracks. Article 7 TEU could however only apply if there’s a (clear risk of) ‘a 
serious breach… of the values referred to in Article 2 [TEU].’ These values include ‘respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities’ (Art. 2 TEU). Only in the earlier-mentioned worst case 
scenario would violation of these values seem a distant possibility. Even if there would be a violation 
of these values, it seems unlikely that all other Member States would support the Article 7 procedure 
and consequently approve to Catalonian accession. Nevertheless, following the earlier mentioned 
controversial remarks from the Spanish Defence Minister, MEPs asked the Commission if the Article 
7 procedure would be initiated if our worst case scenario would come true.148 Although not very 
realistic in political terms, this second scenario is a possibility within the framework of the current 
                                                          
146
 Financial Times, Spain and Catalonia fail to narrow divide over breakaway quest, (30-07-2014) accessed at 
08-09-2014 via: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/835fff04-17f8-11e4-b842-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3CjFeIWoZ 
147
 Source: Zimbio, Mariano Rajoy meets with Artur Mas, (29-07-2014) accessed at 08-09-2014 via: 
http://www.zimbio.com/pictures/TYyORe920AA/Mariano+Rajoy+Meets+Artur+Mas/7aICmXQAE-
o/Mariano+Rajoy 
148
 European Parliament, Parliamentary questions, subject: Hypothetical military intervention in Spain, E-
000266-14, (13-01-2014)  
53 
 
Treaties. Brussels would however severely alienate Spain and several other Member States as well if 
it were to intervene through the Article 7 procedure.  
At any rate, Catalonia is an important region within the EU. Its regional GDP is bigger than that of 
Greece, and with 7.5 million Catalans it is more populous than 12 existing Member States. Moreover, 
as a Mediterranean region Catalonia (and Spain for that matter) controls important parts of the EU’s 
external border, making Catalonia a crucial player in the EU’s struggles with African migration 
streams. Obviously Catalonia is an important region for the EU, and there are clear incentives to keep 
Catalonia in the Union if it were to become independent in one way or another.  
 Simultaneously, Spain is a very important existing Member State that shouldn’t be alienated 
from Brussels. In terms of population size and GDP Spain is the 5th Member State of the Union, and 
controls equally important shares of the southern external border. Both EU and national leaders are 
aware of this, and have been very careful in portraying their views about what would happen if the 
Catalans would choose for independence (unilaterally). Whereas most Member States simply ignore 
potential existence of the situation, the European Commission has fired multiple warning shots 
towards European separatists. Even though Barroso’s remarks about secessionists finding themselves 
‘outside of the Union’ were aimed at the Scottish separatists, they clearly served as a warning to 
Catalan separatists as well.  
Membership of the EU remains an important objective for the Catalan separatists, just as much as in 
the Scottish and Flemish cases. The pro-EU attitude of the Catalan separatists can be explained in a 
largely similar way to the Scottish case: the European Single Market and Schengen would ensure that 
independence doesn’t come at the high price of economic and demographic segregation with the 
remainder of Spain. Since international borders between Member States in continental Europe have 
largely disappeared, independent EU-membership is portrayed as maintaining the good parts of the 
status quo whilst receiving full fiscal, economic, cultural and political self-determination. Moreover, 
EU-membership offers Catalonia a ‘safe haven’; if they would be recognized as an independent 
Member State they would be immune for Spanish attempts of restoring order (for which political will 
surely exists in Madrid, if the Defence Minister’s remarks give any indication of what would happen 
in case of unilateral secession). The EU therefore, can guarantee Catalan independence through 
independent membership. This ‘warranty for independence’ was a similar incentive for many 
Central- and Eastern-European newly-independent states to apply for NATO and EU-membership 
following the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the early 1990s. Thus, the EU would conserve the ‘old’ 
benefits of Spain whilst simultaneously ensuring the existence of the ‘new’ Catalonia. 
The Catalan case is a very complex political minefield, where no outcome is yet predictable. 
Negotiations with Madrid about the organization of the referendum have failed for the moment, but 
it remains to be seen whether Madrid would be able to ignore the popular support for Catalan 
independence forever. If the Catalan government decides to organize the referendum or 
alternatively early elections, there is a significant chance that the Catalans will vote for 
independence. If this occurs, transition to independence and EU-Membership can most likely only be 
reached through successful, new negotiations with Madrid. Alternatively, unilateral secession would 
project a vastly different scenario that is likely to divide both Spain and European countries. If 
Catalonia would succeed in achieving international recognition and EU-Membership through 
unilateral secession, this would set a precedent that challenges the very raison d’être of many 
national states in Europe.  
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Chapter review and conclusions 
 
This chapter analysed the Catalan separatist movement. This movement originates from a grass roots 
movement; great popular support for independence which was expressed in enormous protests that 
in turn convinced some major political parties to side with the separatists. These political parties (CiU 
and ERC being the most important) now cooperate in the Catalan regional government and are 
dedicated to organizing an independence referendum. Since the referendum has been declared 
illegal by the Spanish government and the Constitutional court, the Catalan government considers 
organizing early elections that would enable the people to vote for or against independence. 
 We saw that the Catalan imagined community is strongly established, with around 94% of the 
Catalans having some sense of Catalan identity, and only 12.9% of the Catalans that feel more 
Spanish than Catalan. Furthermore, the Catalan imagined community has its own language that is 
spoken by the majority of the Catalans. These cornerstones of the imagined community, language 
and identity are crucial to the Catalan separatist movement. Equally important are the economic 
arguments used by the separatists. The existing ‘fiscal deficit’ causes large sums tax money to flow 
out of Catalonia to other regions in Spain, and the economic misery that has hit Spain (and Catalonia) 
following the economic crisis has made the government in Madrid increasingly unpopular. High 
unemployment rates and budget cuts forced by Madrid have made many Catalans believe that they 
would be better off spending all their tax money in Catalonia instead of continuing the solidarity with 
the rest of Spain.           
 The legal and political stalemate that came into existence after a final round of negotiations 
between Madrid and Barcelona failed makes this case a very complicated one. If the Catalans were to 
choose for independence, either through a referendum or via elections, it remains to be seen if a 
transition to independence is realisable. Ideally, Barcelona and Madrid would be able to agree at the 
negotiating table, although any form of independence seems unacceptable for the current Spanish 
government. If negotiations would fail, the Catalonian separatists would likely unilaterally secede. 
Not only could this lead to open (violent) conflict with Madrid, but also European leaders and the EU 
itself would probably be extremely divided on whether a unilaterally seceded Catalonia should be 
recognized or not. This is even more complicated for independent Catalan EU-Membership, which 
can only be realised with the consent of Spain (and 27 other Member States) or through an article 7-
procedure, which would suspend Spanish veto rights. Both seem extremely unlikely, but Catalonia is 
economically, geographically and demographically an important region for the EU. Many national 
leaders probably wouldn’t agree to cutting Catalonia loose from the EU, whilst simultaneously few of 
them would want to risk alienating Spain from Europe. Meanwhile, membership of the EU is 
portrayed by the separatists as a means of protecting Catalan independence from possible Spanish 
restoration attempts, whilst simultaneously retaining the good parts of the status quo. 
The Catalan case is therefore probably the most complicated one, of the three here considered. It is 
highly unpredictable what would happen if Catalonia were to declare its independence, and the only 
successful route out of Spain and into the EU seems to go directly through Madrid. Therefore, it 
would probably take a change in government there if the Catalonian separatists hope to negotiate 
their way to independence. Nevertheless, few Spanish leaders can be expected to cooperate willingly 
at dissolving their ‘indivisible homeland’. 
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Chapter IV: Flanders 
 
Background 
 
“Vlaanderen. Staat in Europa en in de wereld.”149 
 
The last case considered in this thesis is an odd one. Flanders, a region that over the past decades 
has always shown significant electoral support for Flemish-nationalist parties, is undoubtedly the 
political, demographical and economic heavyweight within Belgium. Despite always embodying the 
clear majority of the Belgian population, the Flemish have for a great deal of their history lived in a 
Wallonian-dominated state. The differences between the two imagined communities are hard to 
overlook: throughout almost its entire history the territory of present-day Belgium has been the 
dividing line between Germanic and Roman cultures. The linguistic and cultural differences are said 
to originate from early medieval times and assumedly have survived until modern times.150 At any 
rate, the country has always been divided between Flemish Dutch-speakers and Walloon 
francophones.            
 This ‘linguistic cleavage’ has gradually evolved into the topic of much political conflict 
between Flemish and Walloon communities, already starting during the Belgian Revolution and 
enduring until today. Flemish separatist groups first formed in the early 20th century, played a 
controversial role during the Second World War, and then re-appeared in the early 1960s. 
Consequently, they heavily influenced the six constitutional reforms between 1970 and 2011.151 
These constitutional reforms, which are called ‘Staatshervormingen’, have gradually changed 
Belgium from a (political) unitary-state into a federation, with highly devolved competences for the 
regional governments of Flanders, Wallonia and the Brussels Capital Region. Despite all these 
reforms, many of the underlying problems that cause tensions between the two imagined 
communities haven’t been resolved, causing one of the Flemish separatist parties to become the 
biggest party in the 2007, 2010 and 2014 elections.152       
 Separatist tendencies were highlighted on several occasions in the past decade. In 2005, a 
group of prominent Flemish intellectuals and businessmen published a ‘Manifesto for an 
independent Flanders in Europe’, in which they argued that for many socio-economic reasons 
Flanders would be better off independent.153 In December 2006 then, the French-speaking public 
television network RTBF interrupted their regular programming with the breaking news that Flanders 
had declared its independence. Although the ‘breaking news’ was actually an War of the Worlds- 
inspired joke, it was widely picked up by international news agencies and even foreign embassies. 
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Despite being fake, the news report re-opened the public debate about Flemish independence all 
over again.154 Comparable incidents followed, especially during the very troublesome formation talks 
following the 2007 and 2010 elections, during which Belgium set the sad world-record of longest 
formation talks (541 days) and during which foreign populists were publicly arguing for the 
dissolution of Belgium and a merger between Flanders and the Netherlands.155 
Clearly Flanders has ‘conquered’ more and more competences from the national government and 
has it, through devolution, reduced the Belgian state to a shallow, highly decentralized federation. 
Despite the increasing number of devolved competences, the Flemish still don’t seem to be satisfied 
with the status quo, even though the latest constitutional reform has only been enacted since 25th 
May, 2014.156 Tensions clearly remain between the Flemish and the Walloons, and the problems that 
are behind these tensions never seem to be fully solved. Even though there’s no independence 
referendum on the horizon in Flanders at the moment, like in Catalonia and Scotland, the 
independence card is one that is still often played by Flemish political parties and it can’t be denied 
that Flanders has a significant separatist movement. For that reason, the Flemish case shall be 
analysed in this chapter, even though it shall be analysed rather briefly since the Flemish prospects 
for independence are less tangible than in the Scottish and Catalonian cases at present. 
 
The Belgian imagined communities 
 
In order to understand the Flemish imagined community it is important to zoom out to the Belgian 
imagined community first. The Belgians have always been a divided people; in pre-modern times 
society would be highly decentralized in what was then known as the ‘southern Netherlands’. These 
provinces had opted to remain loyal to the Spanish King after first joining the Dutch Revolt, thereby 
consolidating foreign rule over pre-modern Belgium until 1830. Spanish, French, Austrian and Dutch 
rulers succeeded each other in ruling in these provinces, but no serious attempts were made at 
centralization until the French Revolution arrived. As a result, when the southern provinces were 
merged with the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815, the southern society was still highly 
decentralized and southerners in general identified themselves with their Catholic religion or their 
local community. Even when the Belgian Revolution eventually broke out, a Belgian imagined 
community did not exist. The revolution itself was a highly coincidental historical event rather than a 
national uprising. When the revolutionaries had seized control over the Belgian territory, they 
remained highly divided on what to do with their territory; much of the southern political elite was 
francophone and simply opted to join France, whilst the Flemish bourgeoisie often remained loyal to 
the Dutch King. History resolved this first stage of Belgian dividedness, when Europe’s great powers 
made it clear that they wouldn’t accept French territorial expansion and when the Flemish were 
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permanently alienated from Orange by the Dutch destructive bombardment of Antwerp.157 At any 
rate, the people living in Belgium have been divided about what Belgium should be ever since the 
birth of their nation.          
 Throughout the 19th century, the Belgian state was dominated by francophones. Wallonia, as 
the first industrialised region on the European continent, was the economical heavyweight of the 
country and its politicians strongly dominated national politics. Linguistic struggles emerged soon 
enough, since French was declared to be the only official language for Belgium; Dutch was only 
allowed to be used in the private sphere. Towards the end of the century, Flemish cultural 
associations gradually managed to acquire concessions on this mono-linguistic policy, but French 
endured as the official language for government institutions in Flanders until 1932. By then, the first 
Flemish independence movements had already appeared and held significant popular support. 
However, when the German invasion came in May 1940, these separatist parties considered it a 
‘window of opportunity’, and gained a reputation of collaborating with the Nazi regime. This in turn 
caused the Flemish separatist movement to become controversial, leading to a diminishment of 
interest in these parties.158         
 The linguistic battles re-appeared during the 1960s, as Flanders emerged economically whilst 
the heavy industry-based Wallonian economy increasingly became outdated. Flanders, which had 
been considered the ‘périphérie’ became the ‘centre’ whilst Wallonia went the other way around. 
Flowing from this change in balance came the constitutional reforms, starting in 1970, during which 
the Flemish ‘conquered the Belgian state’. The Flemish acquired cultural and linguistic devolution, 
and the Walloons increasingly resented what they now considered the ‘État belgo-flamand’.159 
 What Belgian history above all shows is that a Belgian imagined community has hardly ever 
existed. Core elements of the imagined community – culture, history and language- are severely 
lacking in the Belgian case. Even today, in “Belgium there is little communication. There are separate 
media, extreme social segregation, separate political parties and more and more authority in 
separate hands.”160 The country has been properly divided along the ‘linguistic cleavage’; Flemings 
and Walloons can only vote on separate political parties in their own regions, they can only 
communicate with government institutions in either Dutch or French, and both communities have 
media that are very focussed on their own community.161 The segregation between Flemings and 
Walloons, which can be interpreted as proof that the Belgian imagined community does not exist, is 
very much institutionalized. This is underlined by the fact that millions of Belgians aren’t able to 
communicate with each other: 
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Knowledge of 
languages   (% of total 
regional population) 
Wallonia Flanders Brussels 
French only 57% 1% 18% 
Dutch only 1% 28% 4% 
Speaks both French 
and Dutch 
17% 57% 51% 
Trilingual: French, 
Dutch and English 
7% 40% 31% 
 
Figure P : Linguistic statistics for the three regions in Belgium. N= 1000.
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Therefore, it is clear to see that Belgium is in many ways (institutionally) divided and even segregated 
according to language. However, identity within Belgium is a difficult phenomenon to grasp. Whereas 
the Walloons identify themselves mostly with Belgium, the Flemings are more likely to identify with 
Flanders but do not produce similar regional identity attitudes as the Scottish and Catalans. 
Unfortunately, similar statistics on identity aren’t available for after 2004 at the moment. If the 
electoral support for Flemish separatist party say anything about the Flemings’ sense of identity, 
levels of Flemish only or More Flemish than Belgian can be expected to have gone up.  
 
Figure Q : Moreno Identity Question in Belgium. N = 817.
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Understanding Flemish separatism 
The core to understanding separatism in Belgium is to recognize that the Dutch-speaking and 
francophone communities live almost completely segregated from one another, and that this 
segregation has been institutionalized, which widens the gap between the communities even more. 
Belgian politicians at the federal level can only be elected by either Flemish or Wallonian voters,164 
which only gives them an incentive to represent the interests of the community that can elect them. 
Flemish politicians will therefore only defend Flemish interests and vice versa. When these interests 
clash, or when compromises have to be made, it is extremely easy to blame the other community, 
since politicians aren’t likely to lose votes by doing so.  The fact that the public media are separated 
along linguistic lines as well further adds to this ‘linguistic cleavage’. Stereotypes and generalizations 
about the other community are widespread, and since politicians have nothing to gain by explaining 
themselves in the media of the other community, Flemish politicians rarely explain themselves in 
Wallonian media and vice versa. This blame-game in politics and the media leads to the situation 
where Belgium is ‘the only country in the world where two oppressed majorities live together.’165
 Moreover, several mechanisms in federal decision-making ensure that no community can 
push through federal decisions without the consent of the other. The compromise-driven politics 
that flow from this, so-called ‘Wafelijzerpolitiek’, often result in political cow trading at the national 
level. Over the course of six constitutional reforms, Flemish politicians have often watered down 
their devolution demands and paid a financial price for Wallonian consent through agreeing to fiscal 
grants or federal investments.166 Even in every-day federal governance, interests are seemingly very 
divided between Flanders and Wallonia as a result of this ‘Wafelijzerpolitiek’. If for example federal 
investments are made into Wallonian infrastructure, Flemish consent will likely only follow if similar 
investments are made into Flemish infrastructure, even when these have no clear purpose.167 The 
Belgian government alternately serves the interests of two very different regions rather than the 
interest of a sole nation.          
 On top of this political cow trading, there is a large fiscal deficit between Flanders and 
Wallonia. Caused mainly by divergence in social security expenditure – likely a heritage from the 
decayed heavy industry sector in Wallonia – there is annual flow of tax money from Flanders to 
Wallonia estimated between 2 (estimate by the Belgian Employers Union) and 16 (estimate by 
Vlaams Belang) billion euros.168 Economic realities like these raise popular support in Flanders for 
further devolution (of social security and taxes for example) or even independence.169 Economic 
arguments argue that Flanders can’t remain competitive on the global market anymore as long as it 
has to keep paying for Wallonia,170 and populists are eager to add that the fiscal deficit is caused by 
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‘laziness’ or ‘corruption’ on the side of the Walloons.171 In short, these economic arguments are often 
used as political arguments:  since the current political system causes negative economic effects, 
devolution or independence is considered unavoidable.  
Nevertheless, despite multiple ‘eruptions’ of Flemish separatism during the past decade (examples 
were given at the beginning of this chapter), the prospects of Flemish independence in the short-
term seem to have cooled down. Flemish separatism is an elite-driven movement, where separatist 
parties are elected but popular expressions of pro-separatism are surprisingly rare.172 This is 
confirmed in popular opinion about the future of the Belgian federation:  
 
Figure R : Flemish popular attitudes on the ‘preferred future polity in Belgium’. N = 1.054.
173
 
 
Flemish popular opinion is therefore more supportive of further devolution rather than 
independence. This isn’t surprising, since the Flemish have acquired a high degree of internal self-
determination and many of the economic arguments for independence could be achieved through 
devolution as well (the fiscal deficit for example could be eliminated by devolving social security and 
taxation competences). In a country that has been devolving for over 40 years, further devolution is 
apparently considered the preferable alternative over secession by many (Flemings) still. The elite-
driven quest for Flemish independence seems to have lost its momentum as well, with the biggest 
separatist party N-VA opting for ‘confederacy’ (de facto independent states that cooperate only in 
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certain fields according to a treaty) instead of outright Flemish independence.174 However, the N-VA 
still states in its statutes that it strives for ‘… an independent Flemish republic, Member State of a 
democratic European Union.’175 This underlines that separatism might be dormant for the moment, 
but hasn’t disappeared from the Belgium.       
 There are several reasons why – despite significant separatist tendencies – Flanders today 
doesn’t face an independence referendum or large popular support for independence, as in Scotland 
and Catalonia. There is a broad understanding that Flanders would probably lose its capital – 
Brussels- if it would ever become independent. Despite being predominantly a francophone city 
today, Brussels has a long Flemish history and was still almost completely a Flemish city in the 19th 
century. Furthermore, large groups of Flemish commuters work in Brussels, making it so that a loss of 
that city would certainly mean a loss of jobs.  Finally, the Flemish population of Brussels might also 
lose its access to public services in Dutch. The fear of losing Brussels therefore, is a strong incentive 
for further devolution rather than secession. Fears about being isolated from the European Union 
form another incentive.176         
 Above all it is the loss of Brussels which should be highlighted here. Unlike in Scotland and 
Catalonia, and independent Flanders could lose territory, something which could impossibly be 
compensated through independent EU-membership. Nevertheless, ‘access to Brussels’ might be 
safeguarded through negotiations, which would be possible in the most plausible scenarios in case of 
a Belgian break-up. Brussels might become independent177 or become the sui generis ‘capital’ of the 
European Union (which would make the city far more complicated to rule than the slightly 
comparable case of Washington D.C.). In both cases, Flemish access to the Brussels job market and 
Dutch-language facilities are not unrealistic. Therefore, Flemish separatism shouldn’t be reduced to a 
movement without prospects. Especially if the Scots (or the Catalonians) would set a favourable 
precedent, the Flemish separatist movement might be ‘inspired’ and pursue independence rather 
than further devolution again.178 Many other European ‘sleeper separatists’ would be likely to follow.  
 
Flanders and the EU 
Belgium is traditionally one of the most pro-European countries in the EU. The proximity of many 
European institutions in Brussels probably makes the EU less ‘abstract’ for Belgian citizens than for 
other Europeans, but still there are better reasons why the Belgians are so pro-EU. If we’d limit 
ourselves to the Flemish separatists we’d immediately notice that ‘Flemish independence’ and 
‘membership of the EU’ are often mentioned in the same sentence within separatist party 
programmes. Flemish separatists might indeed be among the most unconditional supporters of the 
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European Union.           
 There are obvious reasons for the Flemings to ‘hang on to’ the EU if they were to declare 
independence. First of all, the maintenance of certain parts of the status quo is important. Like in 
Scotland and Catalonia, the Flemish separatists wouldn’t want to sever all economic and 
demographic links between Flanders and the remainder of Belgium. Secondly, through the Flemish 
capital – which is Brussels- there is a direct link to the European Union, both in terms of employment 
and international prestige. Brussels being a Flemish city in origin and now the capital of the biggest 
economic bloc in the world gives Flanders a certain degree of prestige, which they rather wouldn’t 
lose obviously, but which does strengthen their attachment to Europe. Finally, Belgium being a 
transit country by geographic definition (both by land and by sea through Antwerp) has a lot to lose 
from exiting the EU. Without the EU’s Single Market and Schengen, Flanders would be dangerously 
small and alone on the European market: the port of Antwerp would take a severe loss, as would the 
transport and services sector. Flanders simply has too much to lose from losing its EU-membership to 
even consider it. The biggest separatist party, the N-VA, seems aware of this and firmly expresses its 
support for the EU in both its statutes and its party programme, and even warns that a state outside 
the EU would see the return of the dreaded Belgian franc and huge traffic jams at border crossings.179 
The smaller, more populist Vlaams Belang instead campaigns against the increasingly supra-national 
character of the EU, but nevertheless recognizes that European cooperation along the lines of the 
Treaty of Maastricht is necessary.180        
 It doesn’t take economic expertise to see that an exit from the EU’s Single Market would be 
disastrous for an independent Flanders. The Flemish separatists are very much aware of the fact that 
Flanders benefits to a great extent from being part of the EU and its Single Market. Whereas the N-
VA is likely to be far more supportive of the EU than most ordinary political parties in other European 
countries, Vlaams Belang has some Eurosceptic views but still isn’t opposed to EU-membership as 
such. The prestige that the Flemings acquire from sharing their capital with the EU, and the 
geographical necessity of open borders are further important factors in determining the pro-EU 
attitude of the Flemish separatists. 
 
Chapter review and conclusions 
 
Flanders is an odd case within an odd country. Throughout its entire existence, Belgium has been a 
country that was divided along a linguistic border: Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking 
Wallonia. The modern Belgian state was for a long time dominated by the Wallonian minority, whose 
heavy industry formed the economic powerhouse of the country, but in the second half of the 20th 
century the Wallonian industry decayed whilst Flanders’ economy boomed. This changed Flanders 
from the périphérique into the centre of the country. Together with the quest for internal self-
determination, especially in terms of language, the Flemish gradually ‘conquered’ the Belgian state, 
only to start devolving most of its competences from the 1970s onward.    
 Today, after six constitutional reforms in less than five decades, the ‘linguistic cleavage’ has 
led to an institutionalized segregation. Flemings can only vote for Flemish parties, have their own 
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public media, have a regional government with highly devolved competences and hardly ever 
communicate with their Wallonian compatriots. Still, the quest for further self-determination hasn’t 
ended yet. Wafelijzerpolitiek, fiscal deficits and the negative discourse about Wallonia (and its 
leaders) feed Flemish desires for further devolution, the creation of a confederation or even Flemish 
independence. Tempering these desires are fears over the loss of Brussels and the position within 
the European Union. Flemish support for the European Union is unquestionable, since most Flemings 
– the separatists included- realize that their country has too much to lose if it were to be isolated 
from the EU and its Single Market.  
There are no concrete prospects for Flemish independence in the short term, since Flemish 
separatism is above all an elite-driven movement of which the most important party has temporarily 
reduced their separatist intentions to striving for a confederation. A precedent from elsewhere in the 
EU might re-ignite Flemish separatism, but for the moment the movement seems to have come to a 
halt.  
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Chapter V: Connecting the dots 
 
This final part will aim at comparing the three cases that were considered in the previous 
part in order to establish whether a pattern exists among European separatist movements. 
Apart from similarities, differences shall be highlighted and explained within their context. 
Finally, after ‘connecting the dots’ of European separatism, the emphasis shall be on the 
relationship between these separatist movements and the EU. Above all, an explanation will 
be sought for the seemingly self-contradicting support for the EU of these separatist 
movements. This explanation will mainly be derived from the cases that were considered 
earlier in this thesis, but additional literature shall be used to further complement the 
concluding theses of this author.  
 
Pattern of European separatism  
 
This thesis began by stating that in all cases of European separatism the movements 
represent imagined communities. In the three cases that were considered, these imagined 
communities always played a crucial role. Identity, which is derived from these imagined 
communities, seemed to provide the fundamental basis for these separatist movements. The 
imagined community is often used as the most basic argument to legitimate independence: since one 
regional community (defined by identity) is different from the greater, national community, this 
regional community should acquire external self-determination. These regional and national 
identities often don’t exclude each other completely, but in all our cases statistics confirmed that 
people were more attached to regional identities than national ones.181 Furthermore, a low sense of 
identity with the nation seemed to relate to popular support for separatism.    
 Another important element of the regional imagined communities is language. All three 
regions historically have (had) different languages than the rest of their nation. Although Gaelic 
doesn’t play a significant role in contemporary Scottish society, linguistic battles in Catalonia and 
Flanders shouldn’t be underestimated. Language makes identity far more exclusive and distinctive, 
since it presents a linguistic barrier between the region and the nation. Catalan separatists are 
convinced that their internal self-determination is breached since the constitutional court ruled that 
Catalan can’t have precedence over Castilian Spanish, and the ‘linguistic cleavage’ in Belgium 
embodies the very core of segregation between the Flemish and Wallonian communities. Language 
therefore certainly serves to strengthen the imagined community as a foundation for separatism.
 The imagined community, and especially core elements such as identity, history and 
language, serve as the emotional ‘setting’ of all our separatist movements. Emotional arguments 
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tend to flow within this setting. The sense of achieved internal self-determination, or a lack thereof, 
might strengthen or weaken this setting. 
The emotional ‘setting’ isn’t sufficient though. This is where economic and political arguments come 
in. These arguments tend to ‘rationalize’ the choice for secession. In all cases separatists argued that 
their region would be better off economically if it were to become an independent country. All 
movements (argued that they) had ‘fiscal deficits’, and that their regions and the imagined 
communities in them would be wealthier and fairer if independence was achieved. Independent 
control of natural resources and taxes were presented as ‘rational’ arguments in favour of 
independence. In addition, these regions already tended to be wealthier per capita than their 
national averages, which the separatists eagerly used to point out that the national economic 
systems are supposedly ‘unstable’ or unfavourable in some other way. These ‘rational’ arguments 
were often presented along with (doubtfully optimistic) economic statistics and simple rhetoric.
 Not surprisingly, all separatist movements that were considered won land-slide electoral 
victories following the start of the economic crisis in 2007. This strongly suggests that, even though 
the consequences of the crisis weren’t always directly noticeable for citizens, economic arguments 
are more convincing when brought in economically hard times. Thus, whereas the imagined 
community provides an all-time emotional setting for separatism, economic crises may activate an 
additional ‘setting’ in which the ‘rational’ economic arguments of separatist cause electoral 
successes.            
 Even then, separatist movements can be elite-driven or grass-roots movements. The Flemish 
and Scottish cases are (in origin) very much elite-driven movements, while the Catalonian case 
originated in a grass-roots movement.  When a legal referendum on independence is organized, 
separatism might become more of a popular movement due to the democratic nature of the 
referendum and the public debate surrounding it. Illegal referenda are likely to provide similar 
popular separatism, since internal self-determination (crucial to the imagined community) entails 
some ‘right to decide’ about the future. Without (prospects for) independence referenda separatism 
is likely to remain an elite-driven movement.  
It is my hypothesis therefore that based on the three cases that were analysed, a pattern in European 
separatism exists. The emotional ‘setting’ is a fundamental condition for successful separatist 
movements. The ‘rationalization’ in turn, which comes from economic and political arguments, can 
under certain circumstances (additional ‘settings’) lead to electoral successes for separatist 
movements, either through an elite-driven process or originating form a grass-roots movement. 
If reduced to an arrow diagram, our pattern would look like this:  
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Pattern of separatist movements within the EU 
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Internal self-determination 
Electoral success for elite-
drive separatist movement 
(Scotland, Flanders) 
Rise of grass-roots separatist 
movement. Political parties 
might follow. (Catalonia) 
68 
 
Differences between and importance of the cases 
 
Obviously all European separatist movement shouldn’t be generalized into a single model. Although 
there is a clear pattern to see, the unique context of each case remains important to understand. For 
this reason, throughout the previous chapters, an overview of the separatist movement’s case and 
the imagined community was always given. In addition, these three cases of separatism do not 
operate within a comparable political and legal playing field. It is also within this context that the 
three cases vary in importance.         
 Without doubt the Scottish case is by far the most important one, since it might create a 
precedent. Scotland faces the easiest ‘route’ to independence, through a binding referendum that is 
backed by the agreement of Edinburgh, making sure that the outcome will be respected by the 
British government. Nevertheless, what would happen after a ‘yes’-vote in Scotland vis-à-vis the EU is 
far more important. There are obvious economic and political reasons why it wouldn’t be in the 
Member States’ interest to exclude an independent Scotland from the EU. However, if the Scottish 
were granted independent membership too easily this will definitely open the separatist box of 
Pandora throughout the Union, threatening the existence of multiple nation-states. The Member 
States that face separatist movements within their own borders are very much aware of this, and will 
undoubtedly attempt to make Scottish accession to the EU as hard and unfavourable as possible. At 
any rate, the Scottish independence vote can turn out to be a crucial event for the future of 
European nation-states and the EU.         
 Catalonia finds itself in one of the Member States that is all too aware of the possible threat 
to its existence. The Spanish government has chosen to avoid the separatist debate by pointing to 
the constitution at home and by proclaiming serious political warnings towards the Scottish 
separatist movement. If Catalonia, despite the political and legal obstacles that they face from 
Madrid, succeeds in acquiring international recognition after it has declared its independence, other 
European separatist movements would surely follow. Whereas Scotland might set the precedent for 
independent EU-membership, Catalonia might set a precedent for unilateral secession within the 
Union. Catalonia therefore forms a good example of a region whose separatist intentions are 
obstructed by the central government, unlike the Scottish case, but like many other separatist 
regions in Europe. At any rate, the current stalemate between Barcelona and Madrid is highly 
unpredictable. Although Madrid can’t ignore Catalan voices forever, it would probably take a regime 
change before negotiations can expected to be successful.      
 Flanders is a good example of one of the regions that might follow quickly if a Scottish and/ 
or Catalonian precedent is set. In their current status quo, the separatist movement seems to have 
come to a (temporarily) halt. One should keep in mind that the Flemish form the demographically 
and economical majority within Belgium, and as such have been able to reform the Belgian state to 
the degree that both communities live completely segregated along the linguistic border, and that 
this segregation is highly institutionalized. If a favourable precedent is set concerning EU-
membership, independence would probably be a smell step for the Flemish, although they might not 
be ready to accept the probable territorial loss (i.e. Brussels) that would come with it. Nevertheless, 
Flemish eyes are on the referendum in Scotland. Flanders is an example of a region in which 
separatist tendencies might re-appear easily if favourable precedents are set. Furthermore, Flanders 
proves that a majority might exclude a minority for emotional, political and economic reasons. 
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Seemingly contradictory: why are separatists pro-EU?  
There is a seemingly contradictory nature to the pattern that we’ve just established however. This 
brings us to one of the main questions with which this thesis started. If separatist movements 
develop from their emotional ‘setting’, which is the regional imagined community, and argue that 
more wealth could be acquired by attaining independent state powers, then why are these 
movements so supportive of a supranational body with far-going economic competences and a very 
distant, extremely diverse imagined community? As a matter of fact, the SNP was for a long time 
opposed to the European Union, stating that they wouldn’t want to ‘trade in London for Brussels’. 
Yet, in the late 1980s they’ve had a change of heart, and are probably one of the most Euro-
enthusiastic parties in the UK today.182 Similarly, Catalonian and Flemish separatist have always 
campaigned for independence ‘within Europe’.183 What do separatist movements have to gain from 
Europe vis-à-vis their nations?         
 According to our pattern, the emotional ‘setting’ and ‘rationalized’ arguments provide the 
core and success of separatist movements. Therefore, it is important to see how a regional imagined 
community perceives the EU. In short, the three cases suggest that when differences between the 
regional and national imagined communities are significant, especially in the field of identity and 
language, attachment to the national imagined community will be less. According to our pattern, this 
creates the conditions in which separatist movements can be successful. Nevertheless, according to 
the Eurobarometer attachment to the European identities is even less than to national ones: 
 
 
Figure S : “Do you see yourself as...?” Attachment to European identity according to the Standard Eurobarometer 81.
184
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Even though these statistics show the national levels of European attachment rather than those of 
our regions, the overall trend is that very few people identify themselves predominantly with Europe. 
Why low levels of attachment to the national identity provide for separatist tendencies towards that 
nation whilst low levels of European attachment do not encourage movements to exit the EU, can be 
explained by the fundamental different nature of European, national and regional identities. 
Whereas regional and national identities can be exclusive towards each other (e.g. an Englishman, 
even though being equally British as a Scotsman, can’t be Scottish) the European identity is inclusive. 
Any citizen of the EU can feel ‘European’, despite the immense cultural and linguistic differences 
between Europeans. Therefore Europe doesn’t ‘threaten’ internal self-determination, since Europe 
doesn’t provide a strong alternative imagined community nor does it enforce one.185  
 In addition, being a Member State of the EU entails being member to a prestigious group of 
countries. Many newly-independent (former communist) countries take great pride in being ‘part’ of 
the same ‘select club’ as countries such as Germany and France.    
 For the separatists’ rationalized arguments Europe has a lot to offer as well. Concerning 
political arguments one must underline that the EU offers region channelled influence on European 
decision-making that bypasses the Member States, which makes the EU a pragmatic political ally for 
regional governments, including those with separatist governments.186 International recognition and 
EU-membership are very much dependent upon political considerations abroad; the EU provides the 
perfect setting for a separatist-oriented region to pursue these things outside bilateral diplomatic 
channels (which regions normally don’t have, with the exception of Flanders).    
 Probably the most important ‘rational arguments’ are the economic ones. Economic 
structures in separatist regions are often very much linked to the national economy, which means 
that secession could be economically devastating if the links to the national market were to be 
severed. The EU’s Single Market provides an ‘umbrella’ for independence, ensuring that the 
connection to the national market isn’t lost and that, ceteris paribus, the would-be independent 
country doesn’t pay an economic price for secession.187 The Scottish case proves however that it 
would naïve to assume that independence wouldn’t come at an economic price: it is uncertain that 
Scotland can retain the Pound Sterling as its currency and keep the UK opt-outs from the European 
Treaties. Moreover, private economic actors might not have as much confidence in the 
independence of a region than its separatist leaders.188 
In conclusion, the seemingly contradictory pro-EU position of separatist movements can be reduced 
to three explanations. First of all, the European imagined community provides an inclusive alternative 
to the exclusive national one, ensuring that regional imagined communities aren’t competing with 
national identities and can be self-determining communities. Secondly, the EU politically empowers 
regions to influence European decision-making and allows them to seek international recognition or 
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support for EU-membership, bypassing national (diplomatic) channels in the process. This makes the 
EU as very pragmatic political ally for regional governments without diplomatic competences. Finally, 
the EU’s Single Market is often (unjustly) presented as an economic ‘umbrella’ against the economic 
fallout that would normally occur if a region were to secede. The EU therefore, ensures that citizens 
wouldn’t lose anything from exiting the nation whilst gaining a lot from the region.  
Obviously separatist leaders tend to project a brighter future than secession would probably bring to 
a region. The cases that were analysed in this thesis all clearly had major obstacles that would have 
to be overcome before independence and independent EU-Membership can even be achieved. 
Moreover, a great deal of uncertainty rests on the future of Scotland, Catalonia and Flanders if these 
regions would choose to secede, since they can only become independent EU-Member States at the 
grace of the existing Member States, some of which have obvious political reasons to turn this into 
an uphill battle. It would only be fair therefore, if the people of Scotland and Catalonia would truly 
know the prospects of their future when they go to the ballots this autumn. Between all political 
campaigns and (accusations of) propaganda, the true consequences of secession will probably unfold 
themselves soon enough. As democrats, we can only hope that our fellow Europeans were aware of 
them when they had to choose between independence and preservation. 
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